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Prosecutorial discretion plays a central role in criminal law enforcement.1 Few decisions 
prosecutors make are subject to legal restraints or judicial review. 2 Consequently, the key 
question for prosecutors ordinarily is not whether their decisions are lawless, in the sense that a 
court might overturn them, 3 but rather whether the decisions are wise or imprudent.4  
                                                 
 1 Despite the practical significance of prosecutorial discretion, the subject for a long time 
received little attention in the academic literature. See RAYMOND MOLEY, POLITICS AND 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 48 (1929) (noting that the “increasing significance of the American 
prosecuting attorney has been strangely neglected by institutional commentators and historians”); 
John Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion – A Comment, 60 NW. U.L. REV. 174, 174 (1965) 
(“Despite the enormous importance of the decision whether or not to prosecute, there has been an 
amazingly small amount of material published in this area”); Frank J. Remington & Victor G. 
Rosenblum, The Criminal Law and the Legislative Process, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 481, 497 (noting 
that “little is known about this most important question” of how prosecutors and others in the 
criminal justice system exercise discretion). Newman Baker and Earl DeLong produced much of 
the early work. E.g., Newman F. Baker, The Prosecution – Initiation of Prosecution, 23 J. AM. 
INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 770, 770 (1933) [hereinafter “Baker, Initiation of 
Prosecution”]; Newman Baker and Earl Delong, The Prosecuting Attorney: Powers and Duties 
in Criminal Prosecution, 24 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1025 (1934); Newman Baker and Earl 
Delong, The Prosecuting Attorney and His Office, 25 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 695 (1935). 
Scholarly interest in the subject, however, grew substantially during the 1970s and 1980s. E.g., 
HOWARD ABADINSKY, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 61-109 (1984); ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA 33-51 (1981); JOAN E. JACOBY, THE PROSECUTOR’S 
CHARGING DECISION: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE (1977) (reporting a LEAA study of pretrial 
screening); WILLIAM F. MCDONALD, THE PROSECUTOR (1979); Sidney I. Lezak and Maureen 
Leonard, The Prosecution’s Discretion: Out of the Closet, Not Out of Control, in CARL F. 
PINKELE & WILLIAM C. LOUTHAN, DISCRETION, JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY: A PUBLIC POLICY 
PERSPECTIVE 44, 45 (1985); Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 
18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532 (1970); Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion -- A Re-evaluation of the 
Prosecutor’s Unbridled Discretion and its Potential for Abuse, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 885 (1971).  
 2 See generally Karl S. Coplan, Note, Rethinking Selective Enforcement in the First 
Amendment Context, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 144 (1984); Robert Heller, Comment, Selective 
Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review 
of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (1997); Andrew B. Loewenstein, Note, 
Judicial Review and the Limits of Prosecutorial Discretion, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 351 (2001); 
Tobin Romero, Note, Liberal Discovery on Selective Prosecution Claims: Fulfilling the Promise 
of Equal Justice, 84 Geo. L.J. 2043 (1996). 
 3 One prominent judge has suggested that, even when charging decisions cannot be 
reviewed by courts, they are subject to constitutional constraints, albeit constraints that are 
unenforceable other than by prosecutors themselves. See United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 
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 A number of commentators have either assumed that prosecutors5 should be “neutral” in 
making discretionary decisions 6 or have criticized prosecutors for decisions that purportedly 
demonstrate a lack of neutrality.7 Previously, neutrality had been associated primarily with 
                                                                                                                                                             
F.2d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J.) (“Our only available course is to deny the 
defendant a judicial remedy for what may be a violation of a constitutional right–not to have 
charging or plea bargaining decisions made in an arbitrary or capricious manner.”).  
 4 See, e.g., United States v. Van Engel, 15 F.3d 623, 629 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, C.J.) 
(“The Department of Justice wields enormous power over people’s lives, much of it beyond 
effective judicial or political review. With power comes responsibility, moral if not legal, for its 
prudent and restrained exercise”). For a few recent analyses of prosecutorial discretion, see 
GEORGE F. COLE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW AND POLITICS 143-209 (6th ed. 1993); JULIA FIONDA, 
PUBLIC PROSECUTORS AND DISCRETION (1995) (reporting a comparative study of prosecutorial 
discretion); Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259 (2001); 
Robert L. Misner, Criminal Law: Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996); Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning the Autonomy of 
Prosecutorial Charging Decisions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion - Knowing 
There Will Be Consequences for Crossing the Line, 60 LA. L. REV. 371 (2000); William T. Pizzi, 
Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative 
Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325 (1993); Ellen S. Podgor, 
The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1511 (2000). 
 5 In alluding to prosecutors throughout this Article, we are not always referring to the 
particular prosecutors responsible for the cases in question. Often, we mean to refer collectively 
to all individuals with ultimate prosecutorial authority (e.g., the Attorney General or United 
States Attorney or the elected District Attorney) and to those in the prosecutors’ office to whom 
authority has been delegated.  
 6 The U.S. Attorney General himself recently announced a policy requiring federal 
prosecutors to seek the conviction of all defendants upon the maximum possible charges. See 
Eric Lichtblau, Ashcroft Sets Curbs On Federal Plea Deals, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, Sept. 
23, 2003, p.1 (describing the new policy). Presumably, the thrust of this policy was to eliminate 
inconsistent approaches within the federal prosecution corps and to impose a “neutral” standard 
to govern charging and plea bargaining decisionmaking. 
 7 A prominent example was the response of Attorney General Edwin Meese 3d to an 
Independent Counsel report which found that, although prosecution of Meese was unwarranted, 
Meese had probably vio lated conflict-of- interest and tax laws. Meese’s rebuttal accused the 
Independent Counsel of a “lack of neutrality,” and questioned whether “a neutral prosecutor” 
would have made these allegations of misconduct based on the evidence. The McKay Report; 
Excerpts From Rebuttal by Meese to Report of the Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1988, p. 
A22. In fairness, we should note that the idea of prosecutorial neutrality is not entirely new. See, 
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judges, and was thought to describe a trait that distinguishes judges from lawyers.8 The emerging 
notion of prosecutorial neutrality recalls the traditional conception of prosecutors as “quasi-
judicial” officers,9 and emphasizes the distinction between prosecutors and lawyers for private 
parties. 
 Neutrality appears to mean something different from, and more specific than, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
e.g., United States v. Wells, 163 F. 313, 326 (D. Idaho 1908)(with respect to the prosecutor’s 
role in the grand jury, “[t]he fundamental idea which runs through the statutes and decisions 
apparently is that the prosecutor must remain neutral, must be impartial, must not undertake to 
control the finding by undue influence”).  
 8 For example, Fourth Amendment case law requires that search warrant applications be 
reviewed by “neutral and detached” judicial officers as distinguished from the police and 
prosecutors. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971) (search and seizure 
violated the Fourth Amendment because warrant was issued by state Attorney General “who was 
the chief investigator and prosecutor” and not by “the neutral and detached magistrate required 
by the Constitution”); Wallis v. O’Kier, 491 F.2d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir. 1974) (“[Supreme Court] 
decisions hold that police officers and prosecutors do not have that independence and neutrality 
which are necessary in the exercise of the issuance of search warrants”). In contrast, courts have 
stated in various contexts that prosecutors are not expected to be neutral. See, e.g., In re April 
1977 Grand Jury Subpoenas, 573 F.2d 936, 948 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that litigants “may not 
demand a neutral prosecutor. . . . A judge should disqualify himself from a case he participated 
in as a lawyer, but a prosecutor need not disqualify himself because he has previously conducted 
other investigations of the same suspect . . ..”); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1231 (2d 
Cir. 1973) (requiring resentencing because a presentence report was prepared “by the prosecutor, 
not a professional neutral”); Franks v. State, 543 S.W.2d 613, 616 (Tenn. 1976) (“We would 
emphasize to the District Attorney General that his role [at sentencing] should be more than 
detached neutrality”); Jennings v. State, 79 So. 814, 815 (Miss. 1918) (stating that, in making 
arguments to the jury, “the district attorney is not expected to approach with the cold neutrality 
of the judge”). 
 9 See, e.g., Roberta K. Flowers, What You See Is What You Get: Applying the Appearance 
of Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 MO. L. REV. 699, 728-34 (1998) (stating that 
prosecutors must “protect society’s values by prosecuting and convicting criminals while 
attempting to ensure that no innocent person is wrongly convicted” and that by doing so a 
prosecutor accomplishes the important goal of ensuring public confidence in the judicial system); 
Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 197, 215-27 (1988)(observing that “in her quasi-judicial role the prosecutor acts 
impartially and judge- like; her orientation to the factual contest is neutral”); cf. Note, 
Prosecutorial Indiscretion: A Result of Political Influence, 34 IND. L.J. 477, 480-81 (1958) 
(“[Prosecutors] have the same duty as the trial court to see that justice is administered in 
conformity with recognized principles of law”). 
5
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common notion that prosecutors should be “fair.”10 But the meaning attributed to prosecutorial 
neutrality has varied depending on the context.11 The term has been used to express diverse, and 
potentially inconsistent, views of appropriate prosecutorial conduct.  
 This Article examines the deceptively complex ideal of prosecutorial neutrality in an 
effort to determine its value as a measure of prosecutorial conduct. If the concept has meaning, it 
can be significant in contemporary debates about the propriety of particular prosecutorial 
decisions. Conversely, if the concept of neutrality fails to capture an employable norm, that 
suggests a need for commentators to rethink their essential approach to the subject of 
prosecutorial discretion.  
 The Article demonstrates that, standing alone, the notion of prosecutorial neutrality is 
unenlightening because the term potentially encompasses a range of norms, each of which is 
itself uncertain in meaning. Commentators need to be more precise about what they expect of 
prosecutors and how particular prosecutors have fallen short of expectations. The Article also 
concludes, however, that the alternative conceptions of prosecutorial neutrality share a valid core 
premise: that prosecutors should make decisions based on articulable principles or sub-principles 
that command broad societal acceptance. This insight poses a challenge, for prosecutors have 
never, either individually or collectively, undertaken the task of identifying workable norms for 
the array of discretionary decisions that their offices make each day.  
 




 Prosecutors do not enforce the criminal law mechanically. Discretion pervades every 
aspect of their work,12 including investigations,13 charging and plea bargaining,14 trials,15 
                                                 
 10 See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2131 (1998) (observing that in plea bargaining, “[b]ecause the 
prosecutor is, in principle, looking for a ‘fair’ price rather than the highest price, arguments 
couched in terms of justice will have more currency than they might in a purely economic 
negotiation. . . . The prosecutor's proclaimed commitment to fairness, moreover, will typically 
permit defense counsel to appeal not only to general considerations of justice but to specific 
precedent”). 
 11 See infra Part IB. 
 12 See generally Note, Prosecutor’s Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1057 (1955) 
(surveying discretionary decisionmaking). 
 13 Prosecutors exercise discretion in deciding whether to initiate a grand jury 
investigation and whether to subpoena particular witnesses to the grand jury. They also advise 
the police and oversee the work of the police and other investigators. See generally Margaret 
McGhee, Preliminary Proceedings, Prosecutorial Discretion, 88 GEO. L. J. 1057, 1058-59 
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sentencing, 16 and responding to post-conviction events.17  
                                                                                                                                                             
(2000) (citing extensive authority concerning prosecutors’ far-reaching authority over 
investigations and grand jury proceedings); Lynn R. Singband, Note, The Hyde Amendment and 
Prosecutorial Investigation: The Promise of Protection for Criminal Defendants, 28 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1967, 1967-68 (2001) (discussing federal prosecutors’ considerable involvement in the 
pre-charging investigation and virtual free rein over the charging decision); James Vorenberg, 
Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1536-39 (1981) (discussing 
prosecutors’ vast discretion in directing scores of law-enforcement personnel and “orchestrating” 
grand jury proceedings); cf. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1973) (J. Douglas 
dissenting) (arguing that the grand jury has become nothing “but a convenient tool for the 
prosecutor” and that any “experienced prosecutor will admit that he can indict anybody at any 
time for almost anything before any grand jury”). 
 14 Prosecutors decide whether to institute a prosecution, which criminal charges to bring, 
whether to dismiss some or all charges, and what, if any, sentence to recommend or to accept in 
exchange for a guilty plea. For discussions of prosecutors’ discretion in plea bargaining, see 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 33-51; Julie Gyurci, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion to Bring a 
Substantial Assistance Motion Pursuant to a Plea Agreement: Enforcing a Good Faith Standard, 
78 MINN. L. REV. 1253 (1994); Lynch, supra note 10; Terance D. Miethe, Charging and Plea 
Bargaining Practices Under Determinate Sentencing: An Investigation of the Hydraulic 
Displacement of Discretion, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155 (1987); Jeffrey Standen, Plea 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471 (1993); Ian Weinstein, 
Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How Mandatory Minimums Have 
Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87 (2003). 
 15 For example, prosecutors alone determine which witnesses to call and what arguments 
to advance. See, e.g., Michael English, A Prosecutor’s Use of Inconsistent Factual Theories of a 
Crime in Successive Trials: Zealous Advocacy or Due Process Violation?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 
525, 538-43 (1999) (observing that, except for scant due process limitations, prosecutors may 
advance practically any factual theory that does not deceive the court); cf. Podgor, supra note 4, 
at 1522 (discussing the decision of when to provide witness statements). 
 16 See generally Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An 
Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501 (1992) (discussing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
under the federal sentencing guidelines). 
 17 Anna Franceschelli, Motions for Post DNA Testing: Determining the Standard of Proof 
Necessary in Granting Requests, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 243, 256 (2003) (discussing a statute in 
Washington that gives decision-making authority for post-conviction DNA testing to prosecutors 
and the state attorney general); Judith Goldberg and David Siegel, The Ethical Obligations of 
Prosecutors in Cases Involving Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 389 
(2002) (discussing the extensive discretion available to prosecutors after a conviction and 
7
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 The fact that prosecutorial decisions are discretionary does not imply that they are, or 
should be, standardless. Prosecutors might have the ability to flip coins or throw darts to 
determine which guilty individuals to charge with a crime, but society certainly would 
disapprove of such a cavalier approach. 18 Commentators therefore have attempted to identify the 
contours of legitimate discretionary decisionmaking. Much of the literature is descriptive, 
anecdotal, or empirical – identifying how prosecutors have made decisions in particular cases or 
categories of cases.19 Some is normative – proposing how prosecutors ought to resolve specific 
issues.20 But it is fair to conclude that there has been nothing approaching a systematic effort to 
define the principles that should govern prosecutorial decisionmaking.21 
                                                                                                                                                             
proposing guidelines for ethical post-conviction decisionmaking); Fred C. Zacharias, Post-
Conviction Justice, ___ ______ ___, ___ (forthcoming 2004) (analyzing prosecutors’ obligation 
to “do justice” post-conviction). 
 18 See United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Given the 
significance of the prosecutor’s charging and plea bargaining decisions, it would offend common 
notions of justice to have them made on the basis of a dart throw, a coin toss or some other 
arbitrary or capricious process.”).  
 19 E.g. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 50 (1968); Michael Kades, Exercising Discretion: A Case Study of Prosecutorial 
Discretion in the Wisconsin Department of Justice, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 115 (1997); Stephen J. 
Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The 
First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231 (1989). The most substantial undertaking has 
been a survey sponsored by the American Bar Foundation in the 1960's that culminated in a 
systematic, but now outdated, study of the prosecutor’s charging discretion. FRANK W. MILLER, 
PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (1969). 
 20 See, e.g., Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their 
Investigative Role, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 723 (1999) (proposing ethics standards requiring 
prosecutors to consider proportionality when deciding whether to employ particular investigative 
techniques). 
 21 Some commentators have tended to define their proposed standards at the highest level 
of generality – urging, for example, that prosecutorial decisions should be “fair”. See, e.g., Sam 
Earle Hobbs, Prosecutor’s Bias, An Occupational Disease, 2  ALA. L. REV. 40, 41 (1949) (“[a 
district attorney] owes the defendant a solemn duty of fairness”); Robert Jackson, The Federal 
Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 3, 4 (1940) (referring to the obligation of “fair dealing”). 
Others have proposed purely procedural solutions to the problems of arbitrariness, 
overzealousness and bias. See, e.g., Aubrey Cates, Jr., Can We Ignore Laws? - Discretion Not to 
Prosecute, 14 ALA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1961) (recommending that prosecutors put in writing their 
reasons for not initiating a prosecution); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and 
Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 18 (1998) (proposing “the use of racial impact 
studies in prosecution offices to advance the responsible, nondiscriminatory exercise of 
8





 “Principles” of decisionmaking differ from “policies”. “Policies” refer to sets of rules or 
specific standards for making particular categories of decisions.22 Prosecutors’ offices, especially 
those that deal with a large volume of similar cases, often adopt policies in order to promote 
consistency and administrative efficiency. Prosecutorial policies typically are not meant to be 
judicially enforceable, are presumptive, and may or may not be public.23  
 “Principles,” in contrast, refer to fundamental, normative premises about prosecutorial 
decisionmaking that ideally underlie both prosecutorial policies and ad hoc decisionmaking.24 
                                                                                                                                                             
prosecutorial discretion”); John A. Horowitz, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death 
Penalty: Creating a Committee to Decide Whether to Seek the Death Penalty, 65 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2571 (1997) (urging decision by committee); Moore, supra note 4, at 400-04 (advocating 
more supervision of prosecutors and enabling acquitted defendants to bring civil suits and 
criminal charges against prosecutors for intentional abuses of power); Podgor, supra note 4, at 
1514 (encouraging the education of prosecutors); Walter Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and 
Inadequate Discipline, 38 SW. L.J. 965, 982-88 (1984) (proposing private redress of grievances 
against prosecutorial misconduct in the trial setting). 
 22 See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor's Exercise of the 
Charging Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 519 n.12 (1993) (discussing particular 
prosecutorial policies). 
 23 See, e.g., Kim Banks Mayer, Comment, Applying Open Records Policy to Wisconsin 
District Attorneys: Can Charging Guidelines Promote Public Awareness?, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 
295, 297 (1996) (discussing the pros and cons of a proposal to require district attorneys to adopt 
and publicize charging guidelines). For example, the U.S. Department of Justice has adopted and 
published policies on a considerable number of investigative, charging and plea bargaining 
issues. U.S.A.M. § 9-2.010 (discussing investigations and whether to prosecute); U.S.A.M. § 9-
27.400 (discussing plea-bargaining generally). The subjects of Department of Justice policy 
range from whether or not to subpoena lawyers, journalists or family members of the person 
under investigation, to whether to initiate RICO or tax charges based on particular conduct, to 
whether to extend leniency to a corporation. U.S.A.M. §9-13.400-.410 (discussing subpoenas for 
news media personnel and attorneys); §9-110.300-.330 (guidelines for initiating RICO 
prosecutions); § 6-4.010-.311 (guidelines for bringing tax charges). Individual state and federal 
prosecutors’ offices may also have non-public policies; for example, policies regarding 
indictments of bank tellers who have embezzled less than a certain amount of funds and persons 
who have been arrested while possessing less than a certain quantity of drugs. 
 24 See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and the Prosecutor’s Role, 26 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 509, 532 (1999) (discussing principles governing charging and concluding that 
“principles alone [often] will not determine the outcome . . . . And prosecutors, like judges, often 
reason from the specific to the general, deriving their working principles from particular 








Some principles of prosecutorial conduct command a broad consensus.25 Others are more 
controversial.26 Principles also can range from global, first-order principles that purport to 
                                                 
 25 For example, most commentators would agree that a prosecutor should not bring 
charges unless she has some degree of confidence that the person charged is in fact guilty – 
although there is disagreement about how much confidence is needed. See, e.g., Gershman, 
supra note 22, at 522 (arguing that a prosecutor must be morally certain that a defendant is 
factually and legally guilty before bringing charges); Kaplan, supra note 1, at 178 (reviewing one 
federal prosecution office and concluding that “It was generally agreed that . . . if the prosecutor 
did not actually believe in the guilt of the accused, he had no business prosecuting”). Many 
would also agree that a prosecutor should not pursue charges unless she is confident that a 
conviction can be obtained. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 1, at 180 (stating that a prerequisite to 
prosecution is whether “the case could be expected to result in a conviction”); Kenneth J. Melilli, 
Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 669. 702 (“the 
prosecutor must refuse to accept the risk of conviction of individuals when the prosecutor has 
reasonable doubts as to their guilt”). There is a range of views on how likely it must be that the 
prosecution will secure a conviction. See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 
ILL. L. REV. 1573, ___ (discussing competing viewpoints). 
 26 One such principle is the understanding that a prosecutor need not charge every guilty 
person who can be convicted. Compare George Framton, Jr., Some Practical and Ethical 
Problems of Prosecuting Public Officials, 36 MD L. REV. 5, 14-15 (1976) (discussing the 
countervailing considerations in a prosecutor’s decision of whether to prosecute a political figure 
she believes to have committed a crime) and Moore, supra note 4, at 377 (arguing that a 
prosecutor must decide whether prosecution would be in the public’s best interests) with 
Newman Baker, The Prosecutor - Initiation of Prosecution, supra note 1, at 770 (adopting the 
premise that a prosecutor “is bound to commence proceedings” if the law is violated). Under the 
commonly held view, charges need not be brought when criminal punishment would be 
undeservedly harsh, when an offense is trivial, or when the offender is subject to sufficient 
punishment by other authorities. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 1, at 188, 193 (describing the issue 
as whether “prosecution in the long run would do more harm than good”); Lynch, supra note 10, 
at 2127 (“[P]rosecutors are not seeking simply to maximize the amount of jail time that can be 
extracted from their adversaries, regardless of guilt or innocence; rather, they undertake to 
determine, in response to the defendant's arguments, whether the evidence truly demonstrates 
guilt, and if so, what sentence is appropriate”); Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in 
Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 35-37 (1997) (discussing 
whether it is appropriate to seek criminal prosecution against corporate defendants when civil or 
administrative sanctions are sufficient punishment); William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of 
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 569-79 (2001) (finding that legislatures trust prosecutors 
not to enforce laws that encompass relatively innocent acts).  
 Somewhat more controversial are the principles that prosecutors should decline to pursue 
charges only when necessary to conserve financial or administrative resources, that prosecutors 
should not seek excessive punishment, and that prosecutors may offer leniency to secure an 
10





govern all decisions to more defined, second-order “sub-principles” that apply to categories of 
decisions.27 Commentators who have emphasized the notion of neutrality ordinarily have treated 
it as a first-order principle of fundamental significance.  
 It is important to advance the dialogue regarding appropriate principles of prosecutorial 
decisionmaking both because prosecutors need better touchstones on which to base decisions and 
because the public needs meaningful criteria for assessing claims of prosecutorial abuse. 
Questions about prosecutorial decisionmaking have been a subject of perennial public concern, 28 
but never more than in recent years.  
 In the 1990s, American society heatedly debated whether several special prosecutors, and 
especially Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, acted too politically (or not politically enough) to 
satisfy the public’s expectations.29 More recently, commentators have questioned federal 
prosecutors’ efforts to combat terrorism, 30 espionage,31 drug dealing,32 and white-collar crime.33 
                                                                                                                                                             
offender’s valuable cooperation against others. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 1, at 187 (discussing 
the use of accomplice testimony); H. Lloyd King, Jr., Why Prosecutors Are Permitted to Offer 
Witness Inducements: A Matter of Constitutional Authority, 29 STETSON L. REV. 155, 155-58 
(1999) (discussing whether prosecutors must bring the highest possible charge and the benefits 
of exchanging leniency for testimony); Lynch, supra note 10, at 2139 (“prosecutorial decisions 
inevitably combine judgments of desert with judgments of resource allocation”); Sklansky, supra 
note 24, at 533-36 (discussing federal prosecution guidelines governing whether prosecutors 
should charge “the provable offenses that would result in the heaviest possible sentence”). 
 27 See infra text accompanying note 121. 
 28 See Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in 
Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1312-13 (2002) (“In the 1880s and 1890s, 
as today, prosecutors were accused of failing to be accountable for pre-trial decisions. The press 
made demands for consistency, principle, and visibility similar to those articulated 
during the past few decades”).  
 29 See, e.g., Paul Butler, Starr is to Clinton As Regular Prosecutors Are to Blacks, 40 
B.C. L. REV. 705, 711 (1999) (arguing that, in assessing the Independent Counsel’s activities, 
“the public is engaging in an analysis of the benefit of prosecution and punishment of a law 
breaker versus the cost of that law enforcement. The way to measure this cost is by gauging the 
effect that prosecution has on the community”). 
 30 See, e.g., Lucy Dalglish, Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
Sept. 5, 2002, p. A17 (suggesting that Attorney General Ashcroft’s Justice Department is not 
serving the public’s best interests when attempting to investigate and prosecute terrorism cases in 
complete secrecy); Edward Alden & Anne Fifield, The Planned Use of Military Tribunals to 
Hear Terrorist Cases May Affect the Trials’ Credibility and Could Make it Difficult for 
Washington to Claim the Moral High Ground in Urging Judicial Reform Elsewhere in the 
World, FINANCIAL TIMES (London) July 16, 2003, p. 15 (suggesting that the failure to prosecute 
detainees from Guantanamo Bay in civilian court weakens U.S. claims of justice and does 
11
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On the state and local level, prosecutors have been criticized for bringing cases that are too weak 
or poorly investigated,34 for bringing prosecutions that are unduly harsh, 35 and for other 
purported excesses.36 The ongoing public debate regarding appropriate prosecutorial 
                                                                                                                                                             
damage to international credibility). 
 31 See, e.g., Commentary, Resolution for Wen Ho Lee, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 17, 
2000, p. C2 (opining that federal government undertook an “overzealous prosecution” of nuclear 
scientist accused of espionage in response to pressure from Congress “to solve the so-called 
China spy case”).  
 32 See, e.g., DEA is Out of Touch, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 19, 2003, p. 16A 
(criticizing policy decision by the federal Attorney General to “unleas[h] the DEA to shut down 
medical marijuana operations”); Not a Drug Dealer, S.F. CHRONICLE, June 2, 2003, p. B6 
(criticizing the federal prosecution of Ed Rosenthal for growing marijuana for medical use, as 
permitted by state law, and maintaining that “the letter of the federal law must be weighed 
against common sense, humanity and the spirit of a voter-approved initiative”); Federal 
Persecution, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2003, p. A14 (“It is a waste of [federal] law enforcement 
resources to prosecute and incarcerate medical marijuana cultivators. And it is particularly wrong 
to do so in a state . . . that has expressly made it legal, after a trial in which the jurors were not 
told the full story”).  
 33 See, e.g., William Safire, Fight It, Martha, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2003, p. A35 (stating, 
“I hope [Martha Stewart] beats the rap because I don’t like the idea of a prosecutor – eager to 
deter others from wrongdoing – twisting the law to make an example out of a celebrity. In doing 
justice, righteous ends don’t justify unscrupulous means.”); John C. Danforth, When 
Enforcement Becomes Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, May, 6, 2003, p. A31 (referring to Arthur 
Anderson prosecution); Jack Quinn, Rich was Railroaded, USA TODAY, Feb. 2, 2001, p. 11A 
(arguing that the federal prosecutors who indicted Marc Rich “misused the racketeering 
sledgehammer . . . to attack Rich for what was no more than a regulatory dispute about process 
and controls”). 
 34 See, e.g., Look Into Their Faces, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 27, 2003, p. B2 
(opining that prosecutor overreacted to abuse of child in foster care by “fil[ing] a weak criminal 
case against a nurse who had seen [him] during a hospital visit”); Investigate, Then Prosecute: 
Bungled Lewis trial: Atlanta Prosecutors, Police Rushed to Indict Before They Had All the 
Evidence, BALTIMORE SUN, June 14, 2000, p. 22A (stating that “overzealous prosecutors created 
an embarrassing fiasco” by indicting football player Ray Lewis for murder before collecting the 
relevant evidence).  
 35 For example, because of particular defendants’ age or level of culpability. See, e.g., 
Once Again, Drug War Picks Wrong Battle,” ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Aug. 11, 2002, 
p. 8F (criticizing the prosecution of a 12-year-old for drug offense).  
 36 See, e.g., Victim of Witchhunt Deserves Justice, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, 
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decisionmaking suggests the need for deeper analysis of the common conceptions of 
prosecutorial discretion. 
 A few legal limitations do bound prosecutorial discretion. Some take the form of 
enforceable law. 37 Other standards applicable to criminal cases do not provide a basis for direct 
regulation of prosecutors, but establish norms of conduct that affect how prosecutors exercise 
their powers.38 Informal mechanisms - including public oversight, political realities, and internal 
and administrative supervision - set boundaries too.39 Yet when all is said and done, individual 
prosecutors’ preferences still control a vast range and number of choices, free of outside or 
supervisory controls. 
 
B. The Role of Neutrality in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking 
 
 Many commentators have suggested that prosecutors act improperly when they fail to act 
neutrally.40 What the commentators mean by neutrality, however, differs.41 Some may not have a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Jan. 20, 2001, p. 16A (describing child abuse prosecution of Margaret Kelly Michaels as “a 
modern-day witchhunt”); Justice Eluded Again in Murder Case, CHI. TRIBUNE, Nov. 15, 2000, p. 
20 (describing a defendant as a victim of “one outrageous jailhouse liar and a handful of 
overzealous prosecutors”). 
 37 Such limitations range from constitutional law governing prosecutorial vindictiveness, 
to statutory law providing remedies for abuses of discretion, to professional rules regulating the 
administration of justice. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §3006(A) note (West 1997) (authorizing federal 
courts to award attorneys’ fees to criminal defendants who retained counsel to defend against 
frivolous or vexatious charges); Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 (1984) (holding 
unconstitutional a manslaughter prosecution after defendant chose to appeal misdemeanor 
convictions, based on a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness). These are “enforceable 
law” largely in the sense that they are explicit. As an empirical matter, professional discipline of 
prosecutors has been rare. Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N. 
CAR. L. REV. 721, 755 (2001). 
 38 These include, for example, probable cause standards for when prosecutors should 
authorize searches or arrests and other constitutional standards that define how prosecutors must 
act in disclosing information or at trial (e.g., in closing arguments). For a discussion of a range of 
informal constraints courts can impose upon prosecutors, see Bruce A. Green and Fred C. 
Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REV. 381, 400-03 (2002). 
 39 Internal oversight can include administrative rules, guidelines, manuals, and supervisor 
recommendations that limit what line prosecutors may do, or are willing to do. See Bruce A. 
Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little 
Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 76-77 (1995) (discussing Department of Justice 
guidelines). 
 40 Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include the 
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Zacharias and Green:




clear image in their own minds of what the concept entails.42  
 In the context of special, or independent, prosecutors, for example, commentators have 
referred to the need for prosecutors to be politically neutral, 43 as well as neutral in the sense of 
being independent of those who have an interest in the case.44 In cases involving high-ranking 
                                                                                                                                                             
Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923, 972 (1996) (proposing that 
the Department of Justice introduce provisions in their ethics codes that ensure prosecutors strive 
to remain neutral in their pre-trial roles); Ken Gormley, An Original Model of the Independent 
Counsel Statute, 97 MICH. L. REV. 601, 616-617 (1998) (arguing that the initial purpose of the 
independent counsel statute was to provide a “neutral prosecutor” in executive branch 
investigations); Lynch, supra note 10, at 2149 (stating that “[p]rosecutors should be trained to 
approach their determinations of appropriate dispositions in a spirit of fairness and neutrality”); 
Michael McTigue, Jr., Court Got Your Tongue? Limitations on Attorney Speech in the Name of 
Federalism: Gentile v. State Bar, 72 B.U. L. REV. 657, 671 (1992) (stating that the public 
generally views prosecutors as neutral parties interested only in a just result); H. Richard Uviller, 
The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM. L. 
REV. 1695, 1701 (2000) (proposing that to properly discharge her duty, a prosecutor must act 
neutrally at least until the case passes to the adversarial or trial stage).  
 41 See Flowers, supra note 40, at 924 (“In determining the offense and the offender, the 
investigating attorney should act not as an advocate but as a neutral fact finder”); Gormley, supra 
note 40, at 603 (using the phrase “neutral prosecutor” to mean a prosecutor who is not politically 
biased or especially beholden); Lynch, supra note 10, at 2128-30 (using neutrality only to mean 
the vaguer standard of “fairness”); Uviller, supra note 40, at 1696 (using neutrality in pre-trial 
determinations as a substitute for the more familiar “quasi-judicial” role of prosecutors). 
 42 To be clear, we should note that this Article is not taking a position on whether or not 
the actions of the prosecutors in the examples are proper. We simply identify the examples as 
instances in which the prosecutorial activity might be criticized by some commentators for its 
lack of so-called neutrality. 
 43 See, e.g., Kenneth Gormley, Starr Should Cut a Deal With Clinton, NEWSDAY, Oct. 2, 
1998 , p. A53 (criticizing Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr for “straddling the line between 
serving as neutral special prosecutor and a warm-up act for Congress impeachment exercises”); 
Stephen Labaton, Rethinking a Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1997, p. A10 (stating that the office of 
the independent counsel was created “to renew public confidence in the political and legal 
systems by pulling sensitive investigations of high officials away from the Justice Department 
and politics and putting them into the hands of seasoned and neutral prosecutors”); see generally 
James P. Fleissner, The Future of the Independent Counsel Statute: Confronting the Dilemma of 
Allocating the Power of Prosecutorial Discretion, 49 MERCER L. REV. 427, 431-39 (1998) 
(discussing the pros and cons of the use of independent counsel to prosecute government 
officials). 
 44 See, e.g., Leslie Boellstorff, Federal Probe Set In Death Lancaster County Names 
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executive-branch officials, some observers have taken the position that Department of Justice 
attorneys cannot maintain the level of neutrality that is ordinarily expected of a prosecutor. When 
persons outside the Department have been assigned to prosecute, as in the appointment of 
Kenneth Starr to investigate President Clinton, 45 the special prosecutor’s output typically has 
been measured against the expectation of neutrality, 46 in the sense of political nonpartisanship.47 
                                                                                                                                                             
Prosecutor, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Oct. 13, 1994, p. 1 (reporting a county judge who stated 
that he appointed a private attorney who “is ‘completely neutral in every respect’” to investigate 
possible police brutality); Special Prosecutor, Houston Chronicle, Sept. 28, 1991, p. A33 (stating 
that the county attorney referred an investigation of county judge to “a neutral, independent 
prosecutor . . . to remove any appearance of bias or impropriety”). Persons who have an interest 
may include not only the targets of investigations and their victims, but also their political allies 
and opponents. 
 45 This investigation is described and discussed in detail in Stephen Kline, Heal It, Don’t 
Bury It! Testimony on Re-Authorization of the Independent Counsel Act, 1999 MICH. ST. U. DET. 
C.L. L. REV. 51 (1999) and Robert Gordon, Imprudence and Partisanship: Starr’s OIC and the 
Clinton-Lewinsky Affair, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 703-707 (1999). 
 46 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 45, 123 at 708 (stating that while the Independent 
Counsel in his referral and testimony before the House Judiciary Committee “could choose to be 
a relatively neutral and objective reporter of facts or a disinterested analyst of the factual, 
constitutional, and legal issues involved, Starr chose neither”); Pat Wilcox, No Neutral Parties, 
THE CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Nov. 21, 1998, p.A8 (stating that House Judiciary Chairman Henry 
Hyde’s efforts “to portray independent counsel Kenneth Starr as neutral was downright funny”); 
Marianne Means, Starr Has One More Chance to Justify Actions and Soften Image, SEATTLE 
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 18, 1998, p.A18 (arguing that the way in which Starr conducted his 
investigation evinced a lack of neutrality); Bruce Gottlieb, What Did Ken Starr Do Wrong?, 
SLATE MAGAZINE, Oct. 17, 1998 (arguing that because Starr did not reveal a minor involvement 
in a civil suit against the president he showed “once again that [he] is not a neutral pursuer of 
justice”); cf. H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr. & Daniel C. Richman, Of Prosecutors and Special 
Prosecutors: An Organizational Perspective, 5 WID. L. SYMP. J. 79, 79 (2000) (“Like many 
others, we have found [Starr’s] exercise of prosecutorial power terribly troubling. Also troubling, 
however, is the difficulty we (and others) have had in identifying ‘neutral principles’ of 
prosecutorial discretion that Starr violated”). 
 47 See, e.g., Richard Pious, Impeaching the President: The Intersection of Constitutional 
and Popular Law, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 859, 897 (1999) (“The public had little use for Starr and 
his investigation, largely agreeing with the First Lady in seeing the investigation as partisan and 
politically motivated”); Matthew Tate Rossettini, Bastille Day: Litigation, Investigation and 
Legal Coup D’Etat in the United States, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 297, 333 (2000) (proposing 
stricter limitations on the power of the independent counsel which would have meant that “Starr 
would not have been able to manifest a conflict of interest in investigating the President because 
he could only investigate what government officials (and the public) with credible information 
15
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 Outside the context of official corruption cases, prosecutorial neutrality can have quite 
different meanings. For example, in death penalty cases, where racial disparities are a subject of 
concern, 48 prosecutors are enjoined to be racially “neutral”. 49 With respect to garden-variety 
investigations and prosecutions, neutrality sometimes connotes independence from the police.50 
And, with respect to the prosecutor’s review of evidence to determine whether to bring charges, 
commentators have used “neutrality” to suggest objectivity.51 All of these definitions of 
“neutrality,” and others that we shall discuss, embody potentially legitimate notions of how 
prosecutors should act.  
 Parts II-IV of this Article illustrate that there are three broad (but somewhat overlapping) 
dimensions of prosecutorial neutrality. Each of these dimensions includes a variety of possible 
components, and each could be defined in a more or less inclusive way. We use the categories in 
                                                                                                                                                             
want him to investigate, not what he wanted to investigate as motivated by his political bias”); cf. 
Ken Gormley, Monica Lewinsky, Impeachment, and the Death of the Independent Counsel Law: 
What Congress Can Salvage From the Wreckage - A Minimalist View, 60 MD. L. REV. 97, 99 
(2001) (discussing the dangers of political partisanship when independent prosecutors are 
appointed); Philip B. Heymann, Should Latin American Prosecutors Be Independent of the 
Executive in Prosecuting Government Abuses?, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 535, 553-54 
(1995) (discussing what “independent prosecutors” can do to “strengthen the hand of 
democratically-elected leaders in preventing abuses by a powerful military in the name of 
internal security”); Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. 
L.J. 2133, 2149 (1998) (alluding to the risk that an independent counsel will be seen to be 
“excessively partisan” against the executive when the independent counsel is appointed by 
Congress or the courts). 
 48 Statistics suggest that the death penalty has been sought and imposed disproportionally 
in cases involving minority defendants and/or white victims. See, e.g., Kathryn Roe Eldridge, 
Racial Disparities in the Capital System: Invidious or Accidental?, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 305 (2002) 
(discussing some of the data). 
 49 See, e.g., Stephanie Hanes, Judge Imposes Two Life Terms in Killing of 2, BALT. SUN, 
Mar. 7, 2003, p. 1B (stating that prosecutors in capital case viewed the case “as an example of 
the office’s race-neutrality”). In other words, prosecutors should not take race into account 
 50 See, e.g., Christie Blatchford, Morin Revelations Changed Nothing, TORONTO SUN, 
Oct. 7, 1997, p. 5 (reporting veteran Crown Prosecutor’s lecture to police “that the notion of a 
Crown attorney being an impartial vehicle for the truth or the presenter of the facts was 
‘bullshit,” gave the “unmistakable message. . . that the prosecutor wasn’t neutral, that he was part 
and parcel of the police team”).  
 51 See, e.g., Lou Gelfand, Does Son’s Disability Justify Privacy?,” MINNEAPOLIS STAR 
TRIBUNE, Oct. 31, 1993, p. 29A (reporting the claim of a lawyer for a client accused of assaulting 
a police officer that a “neutral prosecutor . . . refused to charge my client with any crime after a 
review of the facts and police reports”). 
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the pages that follow simply as a way of organizing our discussion. 
 One well-accepted aspect of prosecutorial neutrality is the notion that prosecutors should 
not be biased in their decisionmaking.52 Bias itself encompasses several concepts. The law is 
settled that prosecutors may not act out of racia l or ethnic prejudice53 or against a particular 
religious group for reasons of its beliefs.54 At least in a basic sense, society also expects 
prosecutors to be disinterested – to recuse themselves from cases when they have personal stakes 
in the matters at issue.55 In general, we refer to the category of “non-bias” as capturing the 
                                                 
 52 See supra Part II; see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.1(b) (3rd ed. 1993) 
(forbidding prosecutors to “invidiously discriminate” on the basis of “race, religion, sex, sexual 
preference, or ethnicity”) [hereinafter “ABA STANDARDS”]; Dwight L. Greene, Abusive 
Prosecutors: Gender, Race & Class Discretion and the Prosecution of Drug-addicted Mothers, 
39 BUFF. L. REV. 737, 745 (1991) (questioning whether prosecutions of drug-addicted mothers 
“is the result of neutral exercises of [prosecutors’] discretion” or a result of racia l and class bias); 
Adina Levine, A Dark State of Criminal Affairs: ADR Can Restore Justice to the Criminal 
“Justice” System, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 369, 392 (2003) (arguing that “ADR 
intervention at the plea bargaining process would provide neutrality at this pivotal juncture in the 
criminal process where racial bias runs rampant”); Rebecca A. Pinto, Note, The Public Interest 
and Private Financing of Criminal Prosecutions, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1343, 1353-54 (1999) 
(arguing that prosecutors sometimes are not neutral because they are not held to a strict standard 
of non-bias); Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: 
Enforcing Protection After United States v. Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071, 1109-1120 
(1997) (linking prosecutorial neutrality and determining bias in selective prosecution cases). 
 53 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (finding that some consciously selective 
enforcement is constitutional as long as the selection was not “deliberately based upon an 
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification”); Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (requiring prosecutors to provide a “neutral explanation” for 
the exercise of peremptory challenges, in the sense that the decision to challenge must be shown 
not to have been based on race or gender); see also Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 
IND. L.J. 375, 419 (1994) (arguing that race-neutrality is the key to the legitimacy of 
prosecutorial charging decisions in capital cases).  
 54 See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (stating that “[i]n 
particular, the decision to prosecute may not be deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard 
such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification”). 
 55 See, e.g., JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAWYER § 11:36, at 443 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that a prosecutor should be removed based upon 
factors such as “close personal friendship, political rivalry, and the display of personal 
antagonism and animosity toward the accused”); Rita M. Glavin, Note, Prosecutors Who 
Disclose Prosecutorial Information for Literary or Media Purposes: What About the Duty of 
17
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dimension of neutrality which presupposes that prosecutors will exclude particular forbidden 
considerations from their decisionmaking. 
 A second common conception of prosecutorial neutrality is that prosecutors should 
engage in nonpartisan decisionmaking.56 The contours of nonpartisanship are less concrete than 
the components of non-bias. Nonpartisanship arguably includes such notions as independence 
from actors who wish to influence prosecutorial decisions, objectivity in weighing evidence, and 
freedom from political agendas. In general, we refer to “nonpartisanship” as covering the 
dimension of neutrality that captures attitudes or states of mind which prosecutors are expected 
to bring to decisionmaking.  
 The third dimension of neutrality is the notion that prosecutors should base their 
decisions on readily identifiable and consistently-applied criteria.57 In a sense, this dimension of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Confidentiality?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1809, 1832 (1995) (“A chief prosecutor must recuse 
himself in other situations where he has a conflict, or even the appearance of conflict”); Douglas 
R. Richmond, The Rude Question of Standing in Attorney Disqualification Disputes, 25 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 17, 62 (2001) (stating that prosecutors should recuse themselves when they have 
a personal interest in a case); Edward L. Wilkinson, Conflicts of Interest in Texas Criminal 
Cases, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 171, 197 (2002) (noting that prosecutors generally are expected to be 
disinterested, but that Texas statutes and rules do not define the level of interest that is required 
for disqualification); cf. generally Susan W. Brenner and James Geoffrey Durham, Towards 
Resolving Prosecutor Conflicts of Interest, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 415 (1993) (discussing 
prosecutorial conflicts of interest more generally). 
 56 See infra Part III; see also Dan Reicher, Conflicts of Interest in Inspector General, 
Justice Department, and Special Prosecutor Investigations of Agency Heads, 35 STAN. L. REV. 
975, 990-91 (1983) (stating that, under the Special Prosecutor provisions of the Ethics in 
Government of 1978, “the Department of Justice is required to recuse itself in favor of an 
independent and nonpartisan investigator and prosecutor”).  
 57 See infra Part IV; see also Laurie L. Levinson, Working Outside the Rules: The 
Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 569 (1999) (“It 
has long been believed that maximum fairness will be achieved by neutral rules and standards to 
guide prosecutors’ exercise of discretion”); Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Laws, 4 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 523 (2000) (arguing for the need for principled prosecutorial 
decisionmaking); cf. Patti B. Saris, Below the Radar Screens: Have the Sentencing Guidelines 
Eliminated Disparity? One Judge's Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1027, 1050 (1997) 
(arguing that the Department of Justice should rely on principled justifications for moving for 
sentencing reductions based on defendants’ substantial assistance). 
 The pressures in favor of principled decisionmaking, in part, are the driving force for the 
efforts of some prosecutors’ offices, including the Department of Justice, to develop manuals and 
other administrative guidelines that regulate or inform individual prosecutors’ exercise of 
discretion. See Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future of Judicial Federalism: “Neither Out far 
Nor In Deep,” 45 CASE WES. RES. L. REV. 705, 749 (1995) (discussing the process by which 
“The Department of Justice and the typical U.S. Attorney's Office have written prosecution 
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neutrality is akin to the much debated premise that judges should act on the basis of law that is 
“found” rather than made.58 It is consistent with the increasing tendency within the criminal 
justice system to impose fixed requirements on discretionary decisionmakers such as judges and 
prosecutors.59  
 The abstract conceptions of prosecutorial neutrality identified above all are qualities of 
decisionmaking to which everyone expects prosecutors to adhere in some cases. On closer 
examination, however, their meaning and legitimacy become less certain – at least as qualities 
that prosecutors’ decisions must invariably exhibit. The next three parts of this Article discuss 
each dimension of prosecutorial neutrality in turn. 
 
II. NON-BIASED DECISIONMAKING 
 
 Let us first consider the dimension of prosecutorial neutrality that suggests prosecutors 
must act in an unbiased fashion, in the sense that they should avoid decisions based on 
                                                                                                                                                             
guidelines, often labeled ‘declination policies,’ that describe principles for informed exercise of 
federal prosecutorial discretion”).  
 58 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69 (asserting that judicial function is not to 
“pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one”); Scott Altman, Beyond 
Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296, 300 (1990) (discussing judicial candor about whether law truly 
controls judicial decisionmaking); Richard A. Epstein, All Quiet on the Eastern Front, 58 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 555, 558 (1991) (criticizing the “standard view . . . [that] judges who simply 
reiterate the ostensible wisdom of the past, who naively believe that law is found and not made, 
are condemned to a second-class status within the lega l firmament”); cf. Joseph W. Singer, The 
Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 9-25 (1984) (arguing “the 
weakness of the theory that law is found and not made”). 
 59 Examples of this tendency include the development of sentencing guidelines 
constraining judges’ sentencing discretion and mandatory minimum and three-strikes laws that 
purport to limit both prosecutorial charging discretion and judicial sentencing discretion. 
Interestingly, the practical effect of such fixed principles often is to shift discretion from one 
actor in the system (e.g., the sentencing judge) to another (e.g., the indicting or plea-bargaining 
prosecutor). See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Political, Social, Psychological, and Other Non-Legal 
Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 28 
(1997) (discussing the phenomenon of legislative channeling of judicial discretion to 
prosecutors); Cynthia K.Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal 
Prosecutor’s Expanding Power Over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 
199, 241 (1997) (arguing that federal sentencing system should be revised to vest initial 
discretion to depart from guidelines in judges rather than prosecutors); Jeffrey Standen, An 
Economic Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 249, 279-80 
(1998) (arguing that the federal sentencing guidelines “enhance the significance of the exercise 
of the prosecutor's discretion instead of serving to embody limiting principles”). 
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impermissible criteria.60 At one level, it may seem axiomatic that prosecutors should not rely on 
criteria such as race and gender, self- interest, idiosyncratic personal beliefs, or partisan politics in 
exercising their discretion. On close examination, however, the concept of neutrality as non-bias 
raises as many questions as it answers. 
 
A. Avoiding Impermissible Considerations 
 
 Most observers would agree that there are some criteria that prosecutors may not 
permissibly rely upon because they reflect an improper institutional or individual prejudice on 
the prosecutor’s part. For example, prosecutors may not prosecute a defendant, or take steps 
disadvantaging a defendant, simply because the defendant is of a particular race, gender, or 
religion. 61 Constitutional principles, at a minimum, forbid prosecutors to base state action on 
such factors.62 Thus, it has been said that prosecutors must act in a manner that is “race-neutral” 
or “gender-neutral.” A prosecutor who is unable to exclude impermissible racial, gender, or 
religious considerations from her discretionary decisionmaking, or who is predisposed to give 
weight to these considerations, lacks neutrality. 
                                                 
 60 An early article on prosecutorial discretion referred to “bias” in another sense – that is, 
as a psychological predisposition to initiate a prosecution regardless of the likelihood of guilt or 
the strength of the evidence. See generally Hobbs, supra note 21. We address this conception of 
neutrality in our discussion of nonpartisanship in Part II(B).  
 61 See Faizal R. Mirza, Mandatory Minimum Prison Sentencing and Systemic Racism, 39 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 491 (2001) (arguing disapprovingly that “that mandatory prison sentences 
enhance the quasi- judicial role of prosecutors, providing Crown attorneys with greater leverage 
to convict a disproportionate number of Black persons”); Developments, Race and the Criminal 
Process: IV – Race and the Prosecutor’s Charging Discretion, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1520, 1530 
(1988) (discussing judicial responses to racial discrimination in charging decisions); cf. Davis, 
supra note 21, at 17 (examining “prosecutorial discretion–a major cause of racial inequality in 
the criminal justice system”). One might add gender to these categories. But because some 
criminal laws specifically rely on gender distinctions (e.g., sexual assault and abortion laws) and 
other crimes tend, empirically, to be committed disproportionately by one gender (e.g., 
prostitution and some crimes involving physical violence), the application of gender 
discrimination notions seem intrinsically more complicated. Cf. Suzanne D’Amico, Comment, 
Inherently Female Cases of Child Abuse and Neglect: A Gender-Neutral Analysis, 28 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 855, 856 (2001) (arguing that child-abuse and neglect prosecutions often reflect gender 
stereotypes and gender bias).  
 62 See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962 (noting the impermissibility of 
selective prosecution “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or 
other arbitrary classification”); cf. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 462 (1996) 
(rejecting claim of selective prosecution based on racial grounds because statistics alone did not 
establish the claim, but recognizing the viability of the allegation). 
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 This conception leaves a host of unanswered questions. First, is it invariably improper to 
rely on race, gender, and religion? At least sometimes, such factors are legally relevant. For 
example, in considering whether a crime of violence was a “hate crime,” a prosecutor may have 
to consider the race, gender, or religion of the accused and of the victim in order to ascertain the 
accused’s motive.63 Anthony Alfieri has argued that pure neutrality with respect to race is 
undesirable in less obvious ways.64  
 Second, how can a prosecutor implement non-biased decisionmaking when law 
enforcement policies themselves reflect societal assumptions about race, gender, or religion? 
Consider, for example, laws that call for the protection of abortion clinics, on the one hand, or 
that restrict abortion practices, on the other. These laws, at least in their adoption, may respect, or 
deny respect to, particular religious viewpoints. A prosecutor may have difficulty identifying a 
religiously-neutral posture for making decisions.65 Similarly, it may be a challenge for a 
prosecutor to remain gender-neutral in the context of sex-crime prosecutions when she believes 
that the underlying law and traditional law enforcement practices reflect gender bias.66  
                                                 
 63 On the problem of racial bias in the enforcement of hate crimes, see, e.g., Frederick M. 
Lawrence, Enforcing Bias-Crimes Without Bias, Evaluating the Disproportionate-Enforcement 
Critique, 66 L. & CONT. PROBS. 49 (2003) and the articles cited therein, at 52-53 nns. 13-18; 
Christopher Chorba, Note, The Danger of Federalizing Hate Crimes: Congressional 
Misconceptions and the Unintended Consequences of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 319, 362-68 (2001) (noting that a federal hate crime statute would likely have a 
disproportionate impact on minorities). Regarding prosecutorial discretion to enforce hate 
crimes, see Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Note, Bias Crimes: Unconscious Racism in the Prosecution 
of “Racially Motivated Violence,” 99 YALE L.J. 845 (1990). 
 64 E.g. Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Race, 48 DUKE L. REV. 1157, 1163 (1999) 
(proposing “a model of race-conscious, community-oriented prosecutorial discretion as an 
alternative to the dominant colorblind prosecutorial canon of race neutrality”); Anthony V. 
Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders, 89 GEO. L. J. 2227, 2244-45(2001) (arguing that in 
cases involving racial violence, “race-conscious” prosecutors should “mobilize citizens in 
demanding their civil rights to racial dignity, equality, and justice,” including, after charges are 
filed, by “allocat[ing] investigative and trial resources to awaken and uplift community” through 
“pretrial outreach and publicity, and the tactical use of narratives at trial and sentencing”). 
 65 Consider the case of a cruelty to animals law that is violated by an unpopular religious 
sect (consisting mainly of immigrants) that kills chickens brutally as part of its religious 
practices. E.g. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
Prosecution may reflect a religious bias if the legislature adopted parts of the statute with specific 
religious practices in mind. Id. at 535 (“It is a necessary conclusion that almost the only conduct 
subject to [the ordinances] is the religious exercise of Santeria church members. The texts show 
that they were drafted in tandem to achieve this result”). 
 66 Cf. Michelle J. Anderson, Violence Against Women and the State Action Doctrine, 46 
21
Zacharias and Green:




 A third issue is the extent to which neutrality requires prosecutors not only to exclude 
improper considerations from decisionmaking but also to avoid discriminatory effects. Race 
neutrality, for example, has implications for drug prosecutions.67 Arguably, a prosecutor who 
targets the sale of crack cocaine on the streets, as opposed to the distribution of powder cocaine 
in corporate boardrooms, fails to act in a race-neutral way because her policy results in 
disproportionate charging of minority defendants. Does it suffice for the non-bias principle that 
she not explicitly consider race in deciding how to allocate law-enforcement resources? 
 Fourth, what does neutrality require in situations in which a prosecutor’s personal beliefs 
about race, gender, or religion are implicated subliminally? It seems fair to suggest that racially 
bigoted lawyers should stay out of prosecutors’ offices, but the same cannot be said of 
religiously observant lawyers. When a prosecutor decides whether or not to enforce laws that 
have a religious aspect, such as abortion and physician-assisted suicide laws,68 her religious 
beliefs are likely to affect her approach. Proponents of the argument that prosecutors must avoid 
religious (or gender or racial) bias in order to be neutral may not all agree that the prosecutor’s 
own beliefs must take the form of agnosticism.69 
 There are additional questions having to do with the identification of forbidden 
considerations. Does non-bias extend to categories other than those that have traditionally been 
disfavored, such as race, gender, and religion? Must prosecutors look exclusively to 
constitutional case law to decide which categories are relevant?70 In the elaboration of what 
                                                                                                                                                             
VILL. L. REV. 907, 945 (2001) (“Ostensibly neutral discretionary decisions by police and 
prosecutors hide intent-bias against women that is grounded in the historical common law of 
rape”). 
 67 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Agnew, 600 A.2d 1265 (Pa. Super. 1991) (holding that a 
prosecutor did not violate due process by refusing to make those who sold drugs in the city of 
Chester eligible for pretrial diversion program while allowing those who sold drugs elsewhere in 
Delaware County to be eligible, because the decision was not based deliberately on race but 
rather on a judgment that Chester was “the hub of illegal drug trafficking” and that the disparate 
treatment was justified by the need to protect the public).  
 68 See, e.g., United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (acquitting 
religiously-motivated abortion protesters, finding that they lacked the requisite willful intent). 
 69 See, e.g., Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, supra note 64, at 2240 (arguing the need for 
prosecutors to counteract seemingly racially objective imagery and behavior that “devalues 
racially subordinate communities”); cf. Sheri Johnson, Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial 
Court Judges, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 475, 502-506 (1998) (urging prosecutors to ask themselves, 
upon challenging a prospective black juror on ostensibly neutral grounds, whether their 
explanations are “inextricably linked with race or racial stereotypes?” and, ordinarily, to avoid 
excusing black jurors because of the history of exclusion of black jurors). 
 70 For example, must prosecutors be “neutral” with respect to sexual orientation in light 
of contemporary mores, even absent a Supreme Court decision recognizing sexual orientation as 
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constitutes impermissible bias, the details remain very much subject to controversy and debate. 
 
B. Avoiding Self-interest 
 
 Neutrality has also been invoked to imply that prosecutors may not consider their self-
interest – personal or economic.71 Some have argued that high-profile cases should be assigned 
only to career prosecutors or senior prosecutors, who are less likely than others to base decisions 
on their own interest in moving to the private sector or climbing the ladder in their own offices.72 
Concerns also have been raised about the motivations of elected prosecutors, whose decisions 
may be influenced by the desire to satisfy voters.73  
 It is uncertain whether all aspects of self- interest can, or should, be excluded from 
prosecutorial decisionmaking. At a minimum, the dividing line between acting on self- interest 
and serving the public is not always clear. When, for example, a prosecutor pursues the death 
penalty because the community demands it, she may do so for reasons of personal advancement. 
She may therefore be criticized for lacking neutrality, in the sense that she has relied upon an 
impermissible factor.74 One might, however, just as easily deem it desirable for this prosecutor to 
                                                                                                                                                             
a suspect criterion for official decisionmaking? If so, was the Texas prosecutor in Lawrence v. 
Texas subject to criticism for prosecuting two gay men under the state’s then-legitimate sodomy 
law? Lawrence v. Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2477-78 (2003) (holding a prosecution 
under Texas’s sodomy law unconstitutional). 
 71 Doing so would create a disqualifying conflict-of-interest under the professional rules 
and probably also would violate federal or state law. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443 (1971) (finding chief investigator and prosecutor not to be “neutral” because of their 
financial self- interest); see also Richard W. Murphy, Superbifurcation: Making Room for State 
Prosecution in the Punitive Damages Context, 76 N.C. L. REV. 463, 531 (1998) (“Prosecutors 
are . . . supposed to be ‘neutral’ in the limited sense of lacking a personal or financial ax to grind 
against defendants”).  
 72 See Richard Cooper, Independent Counsel, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 1, 1999, p.B20 (arguing 
that senior career prosecutors are less likely than private practitioners who are appointed to serve 
as Independent Counsel to be tempted to use a high-profile prosecution as a springboard to 
personal advancement or public renown); cf. GEORGE F. COLE, POLITICS AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION FO JUSTICE 112, 150-53 (1973) (discussing the historical tradition of “The use 
of the office of the prosecuting attorney as a stepping-stone to more prestigious governmental 
positions”). 
 73 See, e.g., Cates, supra note 21, at 10 (“seldom could an elected American statesman 
remain in office to serve as a statesman unless he was also a good politician”). 
 74 See Coramae Richey Mann, Drugs: We Don’t Need More Wars, 31 VAL. U.L. REV. 
565, 574 (1997) (arguing that legislatures should eliminate “mandatory punishments and return 
the balance of power to neutral judges rather than ‘partisan prosecutors’ who seek ‘to advance 
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be publicly accountable and, hence, for her to consider the popularity of her decision.  
 Even if one accepts that prosecutors must disregard all aspects of their self- interest, it is 
not clear that prosecutors ever can be entirely neutral in this sense. A prosecutor can avoid cases 
that implicate her direct interests; for example, those in which she has a financial interest or in 
which a relative is the defendant or victim. But all prosecutors inevitably have a reputational 
interest in all their cases, because the results reflect on their abilities. Even prosecutors on the 
brink of retirement are likely to care about their legacies.  
 Therefore, insofar as neutrality is a proxy for decisionmaking that excludes self- interest, 
it must be a relative concept. As such, this conception of neutrality becomes less useful as a 
standard for assessing prosecutors’ decisions. When a particular decision appears to advance a 
prosecutor’s career,75 it may also be impossible to determine whether self-promotion was a 
motivation for, or an unintended byproduct of, the decision. 
 
C. Excluding Personal Beliefs 
 
 Prosecutorial neutrality arguably also implies that prosecutors should avoid relying upon 
idiosyncratic personal beliefs, such as their own moral values and conceptions of the public 
good.76 In the ideal world, all prosecutors – including prosecutors with varying viewpoints – 
would reach roughly the same decisions in similar cases. 
 This conception too is subject to question. One would expect prosecutors to exercise 
discretion on the basis of what they believe is good or right. They are elected or appointed, in 
part, precisely because of society’s confidence in their judgment. The exercise of judgment 
inevitably includes reaching conclusions about what decisions will best serve the public. 
 Consider, for example, the decision of whether to seek the death penalty in a particular 
case.77 Death penalty statutes presuppose that prosecutors will not invariably seek capital 
                                                                                                                                                             
their own careers by securing convictions,’ especially in high-profile cases”); F. Thomas 
Schornhorst, Preliminary Screening of Prosecutorial Access to Death Qualified Juries: A 
Missing Constitutional Link, 62 IND. L.J. 295, 306 (1987) (“An elected prosecutor's choice to 
initiate a capital case cannot be divorced from the prosecutor's desire for reelection”). 
 75 As, for example, when a prosecutor initiates charges in a high-profile case. 
 76 Cf. ABA STANDARDS, Standard 3-1.3 commentary (“a prosecutor should not allow 
personal . . . beliefs to interfere with the professional performance of official duties”); Mendoza 
Toro v. Gil, 110 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.P.R. 2000) (assistant federal prosecutor may be required to 
prosecute persons charged with trespassing on the U.S. navy base in Vieques despite her moral 
opposition to prosecuting the cases). 
 77 See generally Jonathan DeMay, Note, A District Attorney’s Decision Whether to Seek 
the Death Penalty: Toward an Improved Process, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 767 (1999) (arguing 
that “the dangers inherent in [death penalty decisionmaking] justify the imposition of controls 
over the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the decision whether to seek the death penalty”); 
Horowitz, supra note 21, at 2571 (describing “the dangers that result when prosecutors are given 
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sentencing whenever a crime technically satisfies the statutes’ terms. But the statutes typically do 
not express criteria for the exercise of discretion. A prosecutor’s personal beliefs concerning 
criminal justice policy seem relevant. In selecting among cases, she must consider, at some level, 
the extent to which capital punishment will deter future murders and the need for certainty of 
proof before seeking such punishment. 
 But may the prosecutor also consider her personal sense that the death penalty is morally 
wrong? To the extent that the public supports the death penalty, the prosecutor arguably acts in a 
biased fashion because she is favoring her own moral views. Yet her so-called personal belief 
may stem from her experience as a prosecutor – for example, her experience regarding the risk of 
error in capital cases. 
 If a prosecutor is entitled and expected to draw on some personal beliefs but not others, 
the question arises of which beliefs are, and which are not, permissible sources for 
decisionmaking. As soon as one determines that “neutrality” does not require the exclusion of all 
personal beliefs, then that concept loses force as a guide for prosecutorial conduct or as a 
standard for evaluating prosecutorial conduct. 
 
D. Avoiding Party Politics 
 
 The conception of neutrality as non-bias may also encompass the notion that the 
prosecutor should not base decisions on party politics.78 In other words, neutrality may require 
that she avoid making decisions in the way he r Democrat or Republican friends wish. 79 At a 
                                                                                                                                                             
sole discretionary power to decide who will face the death penalty at trial”); Anthony Neddo, 
Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in Charging the Death Penalty: Opening the Doors to 
Arbitrary Decisionmaking in New York Capital Cases, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1949, 1950 (1997) 
(arguing that death penalty charging depends on “arbitrary decisionmaking processes reflective 
of an individual prosecutor’s moral or ideological position on the death penalty, or on his or her 
notion of justice”); Ashley Rupp, Death Penalty Prosecutorial Charging Decisions and County 
Budgetary Restrictions: Is the Death Penalty Arbitrarily based on County Funding?, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2735, 2739 (2003) (considering “constitutional problems that arise when 
prosecutors take budgetary considerations into account in capital charging decisions”). 
 78 Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts from the Administration of Justice: Conflicts of 
Interest and Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act , 79 GEO. L.J. 1, 4 (1990) 
(“Prosecution of criminal offenses is a paradigm of a function that should be protected from 
political or other nonneutral interests. In fact, its neutrality is not merely a governmental 
aspiration; it is a constitutional requirement”). 
 79 See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 683 (1996) (maintaining that a 
prosecutor must “exercise [his or her] discretion in a disinterested, nonpartisan fashion,” and 
therefore may not exercise prosecutorial discretion “to advance his or her own political interests 
or those of another”); cf. Jae Won Kim, The Ideal and the Reality of the Korean Legal 
Profession, 1 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 45, 57 (2001) (“Although political neutrality among 
prosecutors may seem to be merely a utopian ideal, it is nevertheless a practical requirement to 
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simple level, everyone would agree to that proposition; the chairman of the local political party 
ought not to control prosecutorial decisionmaking. However, to the extent a district attorney is 
elected because of her political stance on particular issues – say the death penalty or counter-
terrorism methods – does she act in a biased way when she implements that stance?80 
 
E. Initial Conclusions About Neutrality As Non-bias 
 
 The conceptions discussed above define neutrality by the exclusion of particular kinds of 
considerations. Yet the identification of these considerations is not susceptible to consensus. 
Only a few of the candidates for exclusion are universally seen as improper, and the specific 
content of the forbidden considerations also is subject to dispute.  
 The application of non-bias principles can be controversial, too. Typically, for example, it 
will be difficult to separate a prosecutor’s implementation of a contestable position on criminal 
justice policy from her implementation of personal views or personal self- interest.81 Simply 
noting the fact that the prosecutor has views on an issue (e.g., the death penalty, abortion, or hate 
crimes) – even religiously-based views – does not mean that a prosecutor’s decisions regarding 
those issues is wrong. 82  
                                                                                                                                                             
achieving the Rule of Law. Partisan bias in law enforcement is not only vicious and morally 
reprehensible but also undermines public trust in the legal system as a whole. . . . The 
longstanding practice of misusing prosecutorial power to suppress political opposition has helped 
give Korean prosecutors a bad name”); Rachel Vorspan, Freedom of Assembly and the Right to 
Passage in Modern English Legal History, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 921, 938, 945-46 (1997) 
(discussing instances of English prosecutors’ use of obstruction law for political ends while 
seeking to preserve appearance of political neutrality). 
 80 See ABA STANDARDS, Standard 3-1.3 commentary (“a prosecutor should not allow . . . 
ideological, or political beliefs to interfere with the professional performance of official duties”); 
cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Beyond the Independent Counsel: Evaluating the Options, 43 ST. LOUIS 
L.J. 1047, 1055 (1999) (“The problem with the concept [of politically-neutral prosecutors] is that 
it naively assumes that we can neatly different iate between politically-motivated prosecutorial 
decisions and neutral or apolitical prosecutorial decisions”). 
 81 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of 
Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2456 et seq. (1995) (discussing “the myth of 
political neutrality” in the enforcement of criminal law); Cf. Christo Lassiter, The O.J. Simpson 
Verdict: A Lesson in Black and White, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 69, 94 (1996) (arguing that, in 
highly-publicized cases like the O.J. Simpson case, “the trial . . . begins to operate on a social 
theme larger than the matter under charge . . . . [N]eutral and dispassionate judicial prosecution 
of wrongdoing . . . is converted into an instrument for a politically motivated prosecution on the 
larger social issue, . . . [and] the public outcry leads to a political subjudicial disposition of the 
trial against a disfavored minority on the larger social issue”). 
 82 This, of course, is the dilemma inherent in the broader issue of when selective 
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 In short, positing that prosecutors must act in neutral, non-biased fashion does not 
prescribe a workable standard for how prosecutors should act. Neutrality so conceptualized fails 
to define which considerations should be excluded, which should have priority over others, or 
how much weight they should be given. 
 
III. NONPARTISAN DECISIONMAKING 
 
 The second dimension of prosecutorial neutrality encompasses principles that mandate a 
prosecutorial attitude or state of mind that might be termed nonpartisan or impartial. 83 There are 
at least three possible notions of nonpartisanship, roughly corresponding to (1) independence, (2) 




  Commentators sometimes employ the term “neutrality” to refer to prosecutorial 
independence from police investigators,84 elected officials interested in the case,85 victims or 
                                                                                                                                                             
prosecution should be allowed. The issue is particularly troubling when selective prosecution is 
based on the prosecutor’s distaste for, or acceptance of, categories of conduct that fit a general 
legislative proscription. See generally Barry Lynn Creech, And Justice for All: Wayte v. United 
States and the Defense of Selective Prosecution, 64 N.C. L. REV. 385 (1986) (discussing the 
precedent leading to the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold selective prosecution of persons 
failing to register for the draft); Heller, supra note 2, at 1331-32 (discussing the judicial response 
to the claim that prosecution of crack cocaine users was improper, racially-biased selective 
prosecution rather than an appropriate implementation of a war on drugs). 
 83 Cf. Jackson, supra note 21, at 5 (“the prosecutor should have, as nearly as possible, a 
detached and impartial view of all groups in his community”); id. at 6 (arguing that, where local 
enforcement and morals vary, federal prosecutors must nevertheless “confine [themselves] to 
strict and impartial enforcement of federal law, letting the chips fall where they may”); Note, 
supra note 9, at 481 (“the prosecutor must conduct the state’s case and present the state’s 
evidence in an impartial manner” because of the duties to prosecute and to protect the rights of 
the accused). 
 84 See, e.g., Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double 
Jeopardy: Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMPLE L. REV. 887, 951 (1998) (“It 
is the occupants of th[e prosecutor’s] office alone who are in the position to check excesses and 
potentially precipitous actions of the police, to serve as more neutral seekers of the truth, to 
consider and pursue hypotheses that may be inconsistent with suppositions adopted in the 
preliminary stages of the investigation, and to ensure meaningful implementation of the 
presumption of innocence”). 
 85 As discussed above, elected officials may have political interests in the outcome and 
even non-elected officials representing the executive branch of government may have secondary 
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their families,86 and other interested parties.87 But one might ask: “independence” in what sense? 
All lawyers are expected to have some degree of professional independence or detachment from 
their clients.88 Prosecutorial neutrality suggests independence that is greater in degree or 
different in kind.  
                                                                                                                                                             
interests that conflict, or are connected with, the government’s interest in criminal prosecutions. 
See infra text accompanying note 81. In the case of federal prosecutors, neutrality may 
sometimes be conceived to mean independence from the President or other executive officers. 
See, e.g., NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES : LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL'S OFFICE 1789-1990, 169-177 (1992) (discussing efforts to “depoliticize Justice”); 
William G. Ross, The President’s Constitutional Role in Confirming Cabinet Nominees and 
Other Executive Officers, 48 SYR. L. REV. 1123, 1183 (1998) (discussing the pros and cons of 
having an Attorney General with close ties, and loyalty, to the president), and authorities cited at 
1184 n.377. 
 86 See, e.g., John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private 
Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 514 (1994) (arguing that the use of private prosecutors who 
represent victims’ interests in criminal prosecutions “is unethical and violative of a defendant’s 
constitutional rights”); Rachel King, Why a Victims’ Rights Constitutional Amendment is a Bad 
Idea: Practical Experiences from Crime Victims, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 357, 391 (2000) (“A 
[Victims’ Rights Amendment] would require the prosecutor to seek the victim’s input and then, 
if he disagrees with it, it would force him to either go against the victims wishes or against his 
own best judgment. Some may view taking away power and discretion from the prosecutor as a 
desirable goal. However, the prosecutor is, at least in theory, a neutral representative of the state 
who is better able to assess the most fair and judicious way to handle a case.”). 
 87 In this context, we are not considering a junior prosecutor’s independence from 
supervisors, but rather the independence of a decisionmaking prosecutor or her office from 
outside influences. Cf. Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure 
Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of Appeals’ Quest for Principled Decisionmaking, 
62 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 68 (1996) (discussing prosecutor Thomas Dewey’s independence from 
the elected District Attorney). 
 88 See, e.g., Jay Feinman & Marc Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO. L.J. 875, 889 
(1985) (noting the ideal in which the “lawyer is relied on for . . . judgment; while engaged 
intimately in his clients’ affairs, he maintains a cool professional detachment from them”); Bruce 
A. Green, Thoughts About Corporate Lawyers After Reading The Cigarette Papers: Has the 
“Wise Counselor” Given Way to the “Hired Gun”?, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 407, 411 (2001) 
(discussing the assumption “that, as legal advisers, outside general counsel asser[t] moral 
influence and exercis[e] professional detachment in ways that other lawyers d[o] not and 
perhaps, as a practical matter, could not”); cf. Peter Margulies, Representation of Domestic 
Violence Survivors as a New Paradigm of Poverty Law: In Search of Access, Connection, and 
Voice, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1071, 1096-97 (1995) (arguing that sometimes “lawyers should 
surrender the neutral, nonjudgmental stance which the instrumentalist style suggests”).  
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 Most obviously, prosecutors are independent in that they, not the police or the victims, 
are the ultimate decisionmakers. This distinguishes prosecutors from privately-retained lawyers, 
who are duty-bound to defer to clients’ decisions on essential aspects of the representation. The 
prosecutor has a client in an abstract sense – she represents the “public” or the “state” – but, 
nonetheless, the prosecutor usually calls the shots.89 
 Neutrality might denote independence in a stronger sense. Arguably, prosecutors should 
make discretionary decisions not only autonomously, but also indifferently to the preferences 
and objectives of interested third parties. In making a judgment about the likelihood of an 
individual’s guilt, the nonpartisan prosecutor would not weigh evidence in the light most 
favorable to any person, but rather would evaluate the evidence as a judge might.90 This stands in 
contrast to the lawyer for a private party in a civil case, whose judgment may be slanted in favor 
of the client’s position. 91 
 This conception of nonpartisanship is not self-justifying. One could easily conceptualize 
the prosecutor’s appropriate role as being partisan in the same sense as private lawyers – either 
representing the interests of the police or the interests of victims.92 One might reasonably argue 
                                                 
 89 Criminal prosecutors are somewhat different in this regard than other government 
attorneys, who sometimes serve agency clients in a very direct way. See generally Catherine J. 
Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The 
Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951 (1991) (discussing the obligations of 
nonprosecutorial government lawyers to their clients).  
 90 See, e.g., Flowers, supra note 40, at 962 (referring to “the prosecutor’s neutral fact 
finding process”); Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 309, 340 (2001) (observing that “[a] prosecutor can maintain a neutral and objective 
view of the evidence more readily than a jury”); cf. Zachary W. Carter, Independence Under 
Siege: Unbridled Criticism of Judges and Prosecutors, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 531, 531 (1997) (“We 
look to judges and prosecutors to make decisions for us that we are not in a position to make for 
ourselves because we have vested interest in . . . controversies in which we have an emotional 
stake, such as situations in which we are relatives of crime victims, or we are victims of crime 
ourselves or when we are accused of crime”).  
 91 See Jake Sussman, Suspect Choices: Lineup Procedures and the Abdication of Judicial 
and Prosecutorial Responsibility for Improving the Criminal Justice System, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 507, 532 (2002) (“Unlike defense counsel's role as unequivocal advocate for an 
individual client, the prosecutor retains the critical responsibility of neutral inquiry into all 
aspects of a case”). 
 92 Indeed, the directly adversarial nature of American prosecutors’ role has frequently 
been cited as the characteristic that distinguishes American prosecutors from their counterparts in 
foreign jurisdictions in which prosecutors are expected to fulfill neutral inquisitorial functions. 
See, e.g., Hiram E. Chodosh and Stephen A. Mayo, The Palestinian Legal Study: Consensus and 
Assessment of the New Palestinian Legal System, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 375, 412 n. 224 (1997) 
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that the adversarial system can produce appropriate results better when such partisanship is out in 
the open. 93  
 Likewise, relying on the notion of independence may be counter-productive because it is 
counter- factual.94 Prosecutors ordinarily are naturally aligned with the police95 and victims.96 
                                                                                                                                                             
(noting “[Palestinian] prosecutorial functions [that are] are inquisitorial and theoretically neutral, 
rather than accusatorial and theoretically adversarial”); Detlev Frehsee, Restitution and Offender-
Victim Arrangement in German Criminal Law: Development and Theoretical Implications, 3 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 235, 246 (1999) (“[t]he [German] prosecutor is a neutral person and 
obliged to present exonerating evidence as well”); Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism 
of Japanese Criminal Law, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 317, 390 n. 298 (1992) (noting “the trust placed in 
[Japanese] prosecutors as highly qualified, supposedly neutral representatives of the justice 
system”); Sohail Mered, It’s Not a Cultural Thing: Disparate Domestic Enforcement of 
International Criminal Procedure Standards – United States and Egypt, 28 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 141, 160 (1996) (“Unlike the U.S. prosecutor, the Egyptian public prosecutor is a 
judicial officer with a neutral role”); Thomas Weigend, Sentencing in West Germany, 42 MD. L. 
REV. 37, 52 (1983) (“A significant difference in legal status exists between American and 
German prosecutors. . . . German law casts the prosecutor in a more neutral position”); cf. Alicia 
Ely Yamin & Ma. Pilar Noriega Garcia, The Absence of the Rule of Law in Mexico: Diagnosis 
and Implications for a Mexican Transition to Democracy, 21 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 467, 
514 (1999) (“Under Mexican law, the Public Prosecutor's Office is supposed to play a more 
neutral role in the investigation and prosecution of crimes than in common law systems. In 
practice, however, the reverse is true”).  
 93 In the trial context, for example, one might take the position that prosecutors ordinarily 
serve justice best by acting as aggressive advocates. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring 
the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 
(1991) [hereinafter “Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics”]; cf. Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea 
Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 1124 (1998) (arguing that an adversarial approach 
makes less sense in the plea bargaining context) [hereinafter “Zacharias, Justice in Plea 
Bargaining”]. 
 94 See, e.g., Ronald K. Chen, Constitutional Challenges to Megan’s Law: A Year’s 
Retrospective, 6 B.U. PUB. INT’L L.J. 57, 71 (1996) (“Prosecutors are by the very nature of their 
position not neutral fact finders with respect to criminal defendants”); Daniel I. Smulow, 
Comment, When Fair is Foul: Federal Drug Sentencing in the Wake of United States v. La 
Bonte, 48 CASE WES. RES. L. REV 437, 457-58 (1998) (“prosecutors are inherently partisan”); cf. 
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416 (1986) (“[t]he commander of the State’s corps of 
prosecutors cannot be said to have the neutrality that is necessary fo r the reliability in the 
factfinding proceeding”). 
 95 Maintaining independence from the police is difficult as a practical matter. Whether or 
not prosecutors work hand- in-glove with police in the investigative stage, prosecutors are 
dependent on the police. Brooklyn DA Elizabeth Holtzman learned this the hard way when, after 
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Elected prosecutors may be unable to divorce themselves entirely from the desires – even the 
whims – of the community.97 Constructing a prosecutorial role based on counter- factual 
assumptions may lead both to unrealistic dependence on prosecutors’ ability to achieve just 
results and to distrust on society’s part when prosecutors fall short.98 More importantly, the 
assumptions may prevent society from developing independent remedies for over-partisanship or 
for correcting defects in the criminal justice system. 
 Nevertheless, the system historically has vested prosecutors with a great deal of 
discretion on the assumption that prosecutors are more removed from the facts of cases than 
police officers and therefore can exercise more independence. Society envisions prosecutors, as 




 A second, related conception of nonpartisanship centers on the notion that a prosecutor 
                                                                                                                                                             
she established a special unit to investigate police brutality cases, 5,000 police officers protested 
outside her office. ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN WITH CYNTHIA L. COOPER, WHO SAID IT WOULD BE 
EASY? ONE WOMAN’S LIFE IN THE POLITICAL ARENA 138 (1996). At a minimum, prosecutors 
and police officers deal with each other professionally on a daily basis, and must treat each other 
as colleagues. They may become friends, and identify, with their counterparts. Cf. Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing With Police Abuse: The Lessons of Los 
Angeles, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 305 (2001) (discussing prosecutors’ difficulties in 
investigating and prosecuting police abuse). 
 96 See, e.g., Richard E. Levy, Opposing Counsel, 47 KAN. L. REV. 583, 585-86 (1999) 
(“Notwithstanding . . . the idea that prosecutors are more neutral seekers of truth than are 
attorneys representing private parties in private actions, it is inherent in human nature that 
prosecutors will come to believe in the merits of their position, regard the targets of 
investigations as guilty, and act as adversaries”); Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1387 (1987) (“[because] ensuring 
the infliction of deserved punishment is part and parcel of the prosecutor's job . . . [the] 
prosecutor’s attitude toward the defendant in a hard-fought case is seldom benign or neutral”). 
 97 See, e.g., Schornhorst, supra note 74, at 303 (arguing, in the death penalty context, that 
elected prosecutors “may be motivated to respond more to a sense of the community's fear and 
its demands for vengeance than to a rational evaluation of the available evidence”). 
 98 For an example of such distrust, see Shaila K. Dewan, Witnesses in Killing by Police 
Want to Talk Only to an ‘Objective’ Prosecutor, Sharpton Says, N.Y. TIMES, May, 27, 2003, p. 4 
(reporting that a spokesman for witnesses to a fatal shooting by the police, which occurred 
during their execution of a search warrant obtained by the District Attorney’s office, announced 
that “the witnesses wanted to speak only to an ‘objective prosecutor,’” and called for the 
Governor’s appointment of an independent prosecutor to investigate). 
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must remain objective in making prosecutorial decisions.99 She must, at all stages of the 
prosecution, review the evidence without predisposition. 100 She must carefully assess the 
likelihood of an erroneous conviction and be attentive to the possibility that she is acting for 
improper reasons.101 While the prosecutor may make assumptions or reach conclusions about the 
veracity of witnesses (e.g., the police) or about the suspect’s guilt, she must do so on a case-by-
case basis without predetermined presumptions. Similarly, in deciding how harshly or leniently 
to treat an individual who is evidently guilty, the prosecutor must weigh applicable 
considerations or apply applicable criteria in an “objective” manner, without any predispositions. 
 One might reasonably question whe ther, as a practical matter, objectivity truly is, or 
should be, a component of neutrality – at least in the trial context. If we expect prosecutors to act 
as partisan advocates at trials102 and assume that this advocacy helps effectuate appropriate 
                                                 
 99 See, e.g., Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement 
of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 
869-70 (1997) (arguing that Brady violations result frequently because of the “institutional 
incapacity of prosecutors to perform the objective weighing of the materiality of the exculpatory 
evidence”); Maria Collins Warren, Ethical Prosecution: A Philosophical Field Guide, 41 
WASHBURN L.J. 269, 270 (2002) (“We should learn as prosecutors to objectively evaluate cases 
before we ever decide on a course of prosecution”). 
 100 Thus, she must avoid assuming that the defendant is guilty based on reasons that have 
nothing to do with the weight of the evidence. Such reasons might include, among others, the 
belief of the police, the victim, or a superior that defendant is guilty, public demand for 
punishment, and the possibility that dropping the charges will embarrass the prosecutor or her 
office. 
 101 See, e.g., COLE, supra note 72, at 145-46 (noting one prosecutor’s concern that, even 
when sufficient evidence to prosecute exists, “We must consider for whose benefit prosecution is 
being undertaken”); Vanessa Merton, What Do You Do When You Meet a “Walking Violation of 
the Sixth Amendment” If You’re Trying to Put That Lawyer’s Client in Jail?, 69 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 997, 1001 n.12 (2000) (“[T]he prosecutor's uniquely nonadversarial role . . . includes 
elements of neutral objectivity and dispassionate evaluation not only of the facts of a case, but of 
their legal, social, and moral implications. . . .”); Uviller, supra note 40, at 1701 (discussing 
aspects of the prosecutor’s role that require “quasi-judicial detachment”). In other words, the 
objective prosecutor not only must weigh the evidence, but she must also make sure that her own 
motivations in reaching her decisions have been pure (i.e, not influenced by improper 
considerations). 
 102 See Kenneth L. Wainstein, Comment, Judicially Initiated Prosecution: A Means of 
Preventing Continuing Victimization in the Event of Prosecutorial Inaction, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 
727, 756 (1988) (“[C]ourts acknowledge that prosecutors are not intended to be neutral. ‘If 
honestly convinced of the defendant's guilt, the prosecutor is free, indeed obliged, to be deeply 
interested in urging that view by any fair means. True disinterest . . . is the domain of the judge 
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results,103 why should the same not hold true for other discretionary prosecutorial 
decisionmaking? 104 Conversely, if the commitment to objectivity defines the appropriate 
prosecutorial role, why should it not apply equally at the trial stage?105 
                                                                                                                                                             
and the jury – not the prosecutor.’”) (quoting Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1056 (2d 
Cir. 1984)); cf. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980) (“[prosecutors] need not be 
entirely ‘neutral and detached’. In an adversary system, they are necessarily permitted to be 
zealous in their enforcement of the law”). 
 103 Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics, supra note 93, at 52 (“One can hypothesize open-
minded prosecutors who present facts neutrally and encourage courts and jurors to emphasize 
defendants’ procedural rights. These idealized government attorneys constantly would reevaluate 
the strength of their case. They would adjust the content and force of each evidentiary 
presentation to further the outcome that they believe the jury should reach on the current state of 
the evidence. . . .  For our purposes, it suffices to recognize that the noncompetitive approach to 
prosecutorial ethics is inconsistent with the professional codes’ underlying theory.”). 
 104 There are bases for distinguishing decisionmaking in the trial and nontrial contexts. 
Most importantly, prosecutors make many pre- and post-trial decisions without judicial 
supervision and without subjecting their own determination to verification by the jury. In some 
instances, the defendant and factfinder will not even know that a decision has been made, as fo r 
example, when a prosecutor withholds discovery based on a determination that particular 
evidence in her possession is not material or exculpatory. See Zacharias, Justice in Plea 
Bargaining, supra note 93, at 1124 (noting the reasons for not applying an adversarial model of 
prosecutorial decisionmaking to the plea bargaining context). 
 105 Arguably, the need for lawyers to remain objective applies to all lawyers, including 
prosecutors, and applies to all contexts. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism 
and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 1303, 1306 (1995) (arguing that maintaining 
objectivity is a significant aspect of lawyer professionalism). 
 It may be that one needs to distinguish the trial from other stages, for both practical and 
theoretical reasons. To the extent prosecutors second-guess themselves too much in advocacy, 
they may undermine their effectiveness as instruments in the truthseeking process. To the extent 
society wishes a prosecutor’s office to serve a role in assessing innocence at the same time as it 
seeks to prove guilt, it may be necessary to divide the responsibilities for doing so among 
different actors within the office. See Uviller, supra note 40, at 1713-6 (discussing the possibility 
of bifurcating prosecutors’ functions). Alternatively, at the trial stage, society may be willing to 
rely on other actors who are present to serve the function of appraising the evidence objectively 
and correcting misperceptions that derive from the prosecutor’s lack of neutrality. See Zacharias, 
Structuring the Ethics, supra note 93, at 56-57 (“Court-enforced constitutional safeguards . . . 
arguably suffice to protect the innocent”); cf. William W. Schwarzer, Sentencing Guidelines and 
Mandatory Minimums: Mixing Apples and Oranges, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 407 (1992) 
(questioning the allocation of authority under the federal sentencing guidelines” to “advocator 
prosecutors” rather than “neutral judges”). 
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 At its root, the emphasis on objectivity stems from the notion that the prosecutor’s client 
is the public, not any individual constituent whose interests the prosecution might affect.106 A 
nonpartisan prosecutor must at least consider the interests of all her constituencies in some 
fashion, including those of the defendant.107 She should not simply follow the instructions of the 
police, nor assume that the police are proceeding truthfully and honestly.  
 It is important to note what this conceptions says, and does not say, about the common 
saw that a prosecutor represents the interests of all her constituents, including the government, 
the public, the victim, and the defendant. Obviously, prosecutors can not serve everyone’s 
interests, since there is a conflict between the public’s interest in convicting at least some guilty 
defendants and those defendants’ interest in freedom. Even if one limits the premise to the idea 
that prosecutors must take account of, and balance in some way, everyone’s legitimate interests 
(including the defendant’s interest in a fair trial), the premise inevitably leads to problems of 
application. 
 Consider, for purposes of discussion, the decision of a prosecutor of whether and how 
aggressively to prosecute violations of anti-abortion and pornography statutes. Different 
constituencies of individual prosecutors, and constituencies of prosecutors in different 
jurisdictions,108 inevitably have diverging views on such laws. The state’s interests may range 
from concern about the government’s ability to enforce the law, to concerns about the effects of 
enforcement on the health care system or other criminal activity (e.g., prostitution), to the desire 
to support the legislative decision to criminalize the acts, to the general interest in limiting sexual 
promiscuity (especially among teenagers) and promoting a vision of morality. The public’s 
approach towards the issue of abortion and obscenity prosecutions likewise are not monolithic. 
As for the targets of the prosecutions, women obtaining abortions or persons posing for 
                                                 
 106 For a discussion of the significance of the fact that prosecutors have multiple 
constituencies, see Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics, supra note 93, at 57. 
 107 See United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1126 (3d Cir. 1977) (“Although the 
prosecutor operates within the adversary system, it is fundamental that the prosecutor’s 
obligation is to protect the innocent as well as to convict the guilty, to guard the rights of the 
accused as well as to enforce the rights of the public”; quoting ABA STANDARDS, supra note 52, 
commentary to Standard 1); Uviller, supra note 40, at 1697 (“Neutrality, I will suggest, puts the 
prosecutor in the position of advocate for all the people - including the person against whom the 
evidence has been accumulating”); Note, supra note 9, at 480 (“The prosecuting attorney 
represents all of the people of his jurisdiction, including the accused”) (emphasis in original). 
 108 Ordinarily, the individual prosecutor responsible for a case will not be particularly 
concerned about how prosecutors in other jurisdictions might act. But see Joshua E. Bowers, 
Note, “The Integrity of the Game is Everything”: The Problem of Geographic Disparity in Three 
Strikes, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1164, 1184-85 (2001) (noting some problems relating to prosecutions 
in multiple jurisdictions). Nevertheless, the approach of other prosecutors may be highly relevant 
to critics and other observers who take a global view in deciding what prosecutorial conduct is 
appropriate. 
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pornography might be viewed as victim or criminal, depending on the circumstances. These 
defendants certainly have potential rights and constitutional claims that the prosecutor might 
consider.  
 It is too facile to claim that the prosecutor in this scenario could represent all of the 
competing interests simply by recognizing that they exist and, in some undefined way, taking 
them into account. At a minimum, there is a very real tension between being independent of the 
various constituents and representing their interests. 
 The notion that the prosecutor must, in part, represent the defendant’s interests 
complicates the conception of objectivity further. Were one to apply this notion in more than a 
minimal sense (e.g., the prosecutor should assess the evidence against a defendant realistically), 
prosecutors would constantly need to reconcile irreconcilable interests – most notably those of 
society or the victim in punishment and those of the defendant in acquittal. Even in scenarios in 
which defendants have legitimate substantive or procedural constitutional claims, the 
prosecutor’s consideration of those interests still may be inconsistent with implementing the 
victim’s interest in retribution or the government’s or public’s interest in incapacitation or 
deterrence. The reference to a prosecutorial obligation to defendants resonates in that it appeals 
to our innate desire for a fair justice system. However, without better definition, it almost 
inevitably produces tension with other prosecutorial obligations.109 
 Thus, objectivity must mean something both more specific and less- inclusive. 
Prosecutors need to consider the interests of all constituents, but perhaps only in the sense that 
the prosecutors are charged with assuring that the process works evenhandedly.110 They must 
                                                 
 109 It may do more. Consider recent attempts by federal law enforcement agencies to 
combat terrorism by indefinitely confining middle-eastern witnesses and suspects and the 
decision to restrict the witnesses’ and suspects’ private communications with counsel. See, e.g., 
Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Will Tighten Rules on Holding Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2003, 
p. A1 (discussing the post-9/11 arrest and incarceration of illegal immigrants for months in harsh 
conditions, often without access to lawyers); Lois Romano and David S. Fallis, Questions Swirl 
Around Men Held in Terror Probe, WASHINGTON POST, October 15, 2001, Section A (discussing 
the incarceration of suspects with Middle Eastern names in solitary confinement and without 
access lawyers); Courtland Milloy, As Taliban Falls, U.S. Confronts New Foe: Itself, 
WASHINGTON POST, November 18, 2001, Metro p.C1 (reporting Department of Justice policy of 
allowing eavesdropping on conversations between imprisoned terrorist suspects and their 
attorneys). Nonpartisanship’s suggestion that neutral prosecutors should represent all 
constituents’ interests implies that the prosecutor in these cases should seek to preserve the 
constitutional rights of the incarcerated persons. She should take care to avoid outside influence 
when public outrage, as existed after the September 11, 2001, World Trade Center attacks, 
threatens one-sided decisionmaking. In practice, however, federal prosecutors have resisted 
implementing this conception of neutrality on the basis of a competing neutral principle: namely, 
their commitment to acting primarily for law enforcement purposes. 
 110 See Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics, supra note 93, at 64 (discussing the obligation 
of prosecutors to assure that the playing field is level). 
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avoid making decisions that affect the various constituents’ interests based on predispositions 
that exclude potentially important considerations. Objectivity does not, however, mean that 
prosecutors need to represent, or further, the desires of all constituents.  
 It is also important to note that the concept of objectivity suggests that prosecutors must 
recognize their own personal insignificance. Although they control the litigation as a surrogate 
for the client (i.e., the public), that does not mean that their personal views and interests should 
be controlling.111 Arguably, they are charged with implementing the legislative will, to the extent 
that it can be discerned.112 
 The devil lies in the details for the objectivity vision of nonpartisanship. Stating that a 
prosecutor must treat the interests of all constituents evenhandedly does not tell the prosecutor 
how to do so, especially when the interests are clearly at odds. Similarly, prosecutors who are 
willing to sublimate their own views and interests may be left without practical perspectives 
through which they can evaluate the evidence. Even outside the trial context, individual 
prosecutors arguably are elected or appointed precisely because they are deemed capable of 
exercising good, independent professional judgment, based on their own experience and 




 The third conception of “neutrality as nonpartisanship” is that, whatever else prosecutors 
do, they should act non-politically.114 This encompasses both avoiding obligations to the political 
                                                 
 111 Cf. Albert Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 
50, 54 (1968) (discussing prosecutors’ views on whether they may take into account “their 
personal opinion” of the applicable law). 
 112 See infra text accompanying note 123. 
 113 See supra text accompanying note 98. 
 114 See JEROME FRANK AND BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY 240-241 (1971) (attributing 
the incidence of convictions of innocent persons, in part, to inappropriate prosecutorial 
decisionmaking arising from a system of choosing prosecutors on political grounds); Note, 
Public Officers – Liability – Bad Faith Sufficient to Charge Prosecutor with Criminal 
Nonfeasance in not Initiating Investigations and Arrests, 67 HARV. L. REV. 352, 354 (1953) 
(attributing neglect or failure to perform their duties on the part of some prosecutors to the fact 
that they are “political officers”); cf. Stanley E. Cox, Halper’s Continuing Double Jeopardy 
Implications: A Thorn by any Other Name Would Prick as Deep, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1235, 
1240 (1995) (expressing a preference for “non-political prosecutor[s]”); Michael Tonry, 
Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1751, 1789-90 
(1999) (“Achievement of moderate, humane practices and policies may be easier in countries in 
which judges and prosecutors are nonpolitical, career civil servants, as in most Civil Law 
countries, or are appointed for life . . .”) 
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parties with which they are affiliated (and which may have helped them obtain their positions) 
and holding themselves above public outcry and frenzy about particular cases.115 The latter 
principle derives from society’s aversion to mob justice. The assumption is that police, 
prosecutors, and courts all play a role in making sure that only the guilty are accused, and that 
even they are treated fairly. 
 In part, this view of neutrality appears to be inconsistent with the separate notion that 
prosecutors should execute the public’s will, rather than their own. In an abstract sense, however, 
these conceptions are reconcilable. A non-political prosecutor arguably can ignore the public’s 
desires concerning a specific case at a heated moment of time while remaining true to the public 
will in a more general sense.116 In other words, the non-political prosecutor will ignore a 
momentary hue and cry but continue to heed public expectations as they are expressed over time 
in the law and popular culture. 
 
D. Initial Conclusions About Neutrality as Nonpartisanship 
 
 The idea that prosecutors should be independent, objective, and/or non-political says 
something about prosecutors’ appropriate attitudes towards the standards that ultimately govern 
their decisionmaking. It implies that prosecutors should not think of themselves as having 
freestanding discretion. The applicable standards, whatever they are, refer to the interests of all 
constituents, not simply the prosecutors’ personal preferences. Nevertheless, the principles of 
nonpartisanship say little about what the relevant standards actually might be. 
 
IV. PRINCIPLED DECISIONMAKING 
 
 The third dimension of prosecutorial neutrality reflects the understanding that prosecutors 
should not act arbitrarily.117 Arguably, prosecutors should base their decisions on “neutral 
                                                 
 115 See Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial 
Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 959 (1997) (“The ideal is . . . in part, negative - one of 
insulation from narrow interest groups and corrupt influences. But it has developed far further, 
into a robust belief, as an affirmative matter, that independent-minded prosecutors are well-
placed to divine the public interest . . .”); cf. Jackson, supra note 21, at 5 (“In times of fear or 
hysteria, political, racial, religious, social, or economic groups, often from the best of motives, 
cry for the scalps of individuals or groups because they do not like their views”). 
 116 The most obvious example is society’s commitment, or will, to adhere to 
constitutional protections of defendants’ rights despite society’s desire, or bias, in favor of 
achieving quick and harsh convictions of criminals. A neutral prosecutor acts nonpolitically 
when she sets aside society’s immediate prefe rence, and her own, in favor of making objective 
principled decisions. 
 117 Courts generally lack power to review prosecutors’ discretionary decisions and to 
overturn them when the prosecutor appears to have abused her discretion. See, e.g., United States 
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principles;”118 that is, norms derived from a source that society can accept119 and that can be 
consistently applied.120 Requiring prosecutors to follow neutral principles empowers the public 
                                                                                                                                                             
v. Jacobo-Zavala, 241 F.3d 1009, 1014 (8th Cir. 2001) (overturning district court’s decision 
denying federal prosecutor leave to dismiss an indictment, stating: “The decision not to prosecute 
. . . is central to the executive power granted to United States Attorneys”); Commonwealth v. 
Lutz, 508 Pa. 297, 306 (1985) (holding that the decision to submit a case for pre-trial placement 
in an Accelerated Rehabilitation Disposition program “rests in the sound discretion of the district 
attorney” and may be overturned only where it rests on a prohibited criterion such as race or 
religion). But mechanisms such as the grand jury and the jury are intended to provide some other 
procedural restraint on arbitrary prosecutorial decisionmaking. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 550 (2000) (observing that the procedural protections of the constitution 
are “meant to protect criminal defendants from the potentially arbitrary exercise of power by 
prosecutors”); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (“The petit jury has occupied a 
central position in our system of justice by safeguarding a person accused of crime against the 
arbitrary exercise of power by prosecutor or judge”). Additionally, the recent Hyde Amendment 
allows federal courts to provide a remedy after-the-fact in certain cases where prosecutors have 
abused their discretion. See 18 U.S.C. §3006(A) note (West 1997) (authorizing federal courts to 
award attorneys’ fees to criminal defendants who had to retain representation to respond to 
frivolous or vexa tious criminal charges).  
 118 See Malvina Halberstam, Towards Neutral Principles in the Administration of 
Criminal Justice: A Critique of Supreme Court Decisions Sanctioning the Plea Bargaining 
Process, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 1 (1982) (arguing for the application of neutral principles in 
the plea bargaining context); see also SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, ETHICS IN 
GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978, S. Rep. No. 95-170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978), reprinted in U.S. 
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4216, 4219 (“No one who has watched ‘Watergate’ unfold can 
doubt that the Justice Department has difficulty investigating and prosecuting high officials, or 
that an independent prosecutor is freer to act according to politically neutral principles of fairness 
and justice” quoting WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE FINAL REPORT at 137-38); John 
O. McGinnis, The Political Economy of Global Multi-Lateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 381, 397 
(2000) (“The result of the combination of interest group pressures and public inattention creates 
a risk that the international prosecutor will not follow neutral principles in carrying out his 
mandate”); cf. Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: the Decision to Seek 
the Death Penalty in South Carolina,74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 754, 756 (1983) (suggesting that 
“the prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty” should be “informed and structured by the 
same statutory guidelines which structure sentencing discretion”). 
 119 In other words, that are not driven exclusively by the prosecutor’s personal 
preferences and world view. 
 120 See Luna, supra note 57, at 523-24 (2000) (arguing that “the appearance of 
unprincipled discretion can threaten the authority of law and those charged with its enforcement 
while reducing popular compliance with legal commands”). 
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to evaluate the bases for prosecutorial conduct and to assess whether a prosecutor has correctly 
and consistently applied the principles in particular cases.  
 By “neutral principles” here, we mean something narrower than first-order principles 
such as “neutrality” or the need to “serve justice” – which also purport to be “neutral” and 
“principles”. Principled decisionmaking, instead, refers to the importance of identifying fixed 
(and presumably more limited) criteria that can constrain decisionmaking in categories of cases 
without depending upon the exercise of a great deal of discretion. One can argue in favor of 
reliance on neutral principles or sub-principles that reflect general decisionmaking norms or 
more specifically on “policies” that simply determine the outcome in particular types of cases.121 
Either approach arguably promotes neutrality, in the sense of facilitating consistent 
decisionmaking that can be assessed with reference to objective criteria. 
 This dimension of neutrality raises some obvious questions. What are the appropriate 
sources of neutral principles or sub-principles of prosecutorial decisionmaking? Which principles 
are legitimate, or socially acceptable, and which are not? Assuming that one can identify 
legitimate criteria for decisionmaking, will they meaningfully channel prosecutorial discretion in 
individual cases (or classes of cases)? To the extent multiple principles or sub-principles drive 
prosecutorial decisionmaking, can they be consistently applied? 
 
A. Sources of Principled Decisionmaking and Their Legitimacy 
 
 Appropriate decisionmaking criteria might derive from criminal statutes themselves. In 
one sense, society believes that it is the job of neutral prosecutors to enforce the legislative will, 
which in turn represents society’s view of prohibited conduct. A second-order principle that 
prosecutors should exercise their discretion in a way that most closely implements the legislative 
will would comport with the notion that the prosecutor’s role is to faithfully execute the law, not 
to create public policy. 
 Alternatively, neutral prosecutors might be expected to base their decisionmaking on 
criteria that find their root in the criminal law in some broader sense – in theories of culpability 
and punishment.122 Of course, the task of discovering appropriate criminal law-related principles, 
                                                 
 121 See supra text accompanying note 22. For purposes of this Article, it does not pay to 
engage in an extended theoretical discussion concerning the difference between “principles” and 
“sub-principles”. The concepts clearly overlap. Some aspects or dimensions of neutrality can be 
characterized as alternative conceptions and therefore “principles” in their own right – for 
example, the notions of objectivity and independence. Other aspects, such as non-bias, clearly 
are sub-principles, in the sense that they only come into play in limited categories of cases. Our 
point in discussing “principled decisionmaking” here is that one view of neutrality is that 
prosecutors will rely upon criteria, however characterized, that are ascertainable, well-defined, 
and capable of being implemented in a way that substantially constrains their discretion.  
 122 Standen, supra note 59, at 275 (“Prosecutors in charging and plea bargaining, much 
like judges in sentencing, presumably are motivated by a disparate mixture of philosophies and 
aims, including deterrence, retribution or just desserts, incapacitation, and rehabilitation”). 
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sub-principles, or policies would leave considerable room for judgment, because criminal law 
theory itself is a subject of much debate. But it is conceivable that prosecutors, collectively and 
over time, could intuit general norms to guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
 More controversial is the issue of whether neutral criteria derived from non-criminal law 
sources are legitimate. To what extent may neutral prosecutors pursue public policy objectives 
that have not been sanctioned directly by the legislature or the culture of criminal punishment? 
How should prosecutors identify neutral principles to govern the pursuit of such objectives? 
 
1. Implementing Legislative Will 
 
 On the surface, the claim that prosecutorial decisions should implement, rather than flout, 
the legislative will seems almost tautological. Yet at its core, the claim is controversial. For in 
some respects, the very function of prosecutorial discretion is to smooth rough edges in criminal 
legislation. 123 Screening of cases prevents over-enforcement and application of onerous penalties 
to minor offenders.124 Plea bargaining differentiates among offenders in a way legislation 
cannot.125 Prosecution and sentencing policies sometimes serve to modernize out-of-date laws.126 
                                                 
 123 See, e.g., Green and Zacharias, supra note 38, at 439-42 (discussing prosecutors’ 
function of “smoothing rough edges in the terms of law”); Brenda Gordon, A Criminal's Justice 
or a Child's Injustice? Trends in the Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction and the Flaws in the 
Arizona Response, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 193, 207 (1999) (“Proponents of prosecutorial waiver assert 
that prosecutors are more neutral, balanced, responsive, and objective gatekeepers than either 
‘totally child-oriented’ juvenile court judges or ‘get tough’ legislators”); Lynch, supra note 10, at 
2138 (“Most people want exactly what we now have: a system in which criminal prohibitions 
can function as symbolic condemnation of behavior we seriously disapprove of, but without 
imposing severe sanctions on every ordinarily law-abiding person who on occasion indulges in 
it; . . . and in which unforeseeable factual variants and individual circumstances can be taken into 
account to soften enforcement of rules that, in the abstract and on average, are appropriately 
made severe.”); Richman, supra note 115, at 959 (noting the argument that prosecutors serve the 
function of “harmoniz[ing] ill-defined legislative policies with principles of individualized 
justice”). 
 124 See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 532, 533-34 (1970) (arguing that prosecutors’ exercise of discretion limits legislative 
overcriminalization and “individualize[s] treatment of offenders”); Lezak and Leonard, supra 
note 1, at 45 (arguing that prosecutorial discretion counteracts unduly harsh punishment of 
undeserving individuals); William C. Louthan, The Politics of Discretionary Justice among 
Criminal Justice Agencies, in PINKELE AND LOUTHAN, supra, at 13, 16 (“there are considerations 
unique to a given defendant that may legitimate a decision not to prosecute”). 
 125 See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A 
LOWER COURT 16 (1979) (“The antithesis of bureaucracy is discretion, the ability to base 
decisions on individual judgments rather than rules”); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 3 (analyzing 
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At least on occasion, prosecutors are expected to interpose themselves between defendants and 
unreasonable or overly rigid laws.127 
 Indeed, legislatures may expect prosecutors to exercise these gap-filling functions and 
accordingly may refrain from expressing a legislative will. Rarely do statutes include explicit 
criteria that dictate prosecutors’ decisions.128 This may either be because the legislators have an 
                                                                                                                                                             
various aspects of prosecutorial discretion, especially plea bargaining, and concluding that the 
prosecutor “individualizes justice . . . and mitigates the severity of the law”); Charles P. Bubany 
& Frank Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Administrative Law for Prosecutorial 
Decisionmaking, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473, 482 (1976) (discussing the impact of prosecutorial 
discretion in plea bargaining on effectuating individualized treatment of defendants); LaFave, 
supra note 1, at 534 (noting the importance of prosecutorial discretion because “A criminal code 
can only deal in general categories of conduct”); Zacharias, supra note 93, at 1136 (noting that 
plea bargaining enables prosecutors to “take equitable factors into account”). 
 126 See, e.g., Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 3 (1971) (suggesting that the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion not to enforce a law may lead the legislature to agree to revise an out-of-date law); 
Griffin, supra, note 4, at 263-64 (“prosecutors are more suited than the legislature to adapt the 
criminal law to new circumstances and to identify when the prosecution of certain statutes would 
be anachronistic”); MILLER, supra note 19, 126 at 294-95 (reporting a study of charging 
discretion and concluding that “no one else is in a better position to make charging decisions 
which reflect community values as accurately and effectively as the prosecutor”); cf. Gyurci, 
supra note 14, 126 at 1265 n.62 (1994) (“Prosecutors circumvent the Sentencing Guidelines by 
engaging in bargaining over facts (changing the amount or nature of the drug), Guidelines-factor 
bargaining (ignoring or reducing the individual’s role in the crime), limiting proof (limiting the 
evidence to be considered in prosecuting a case), bringing less severe alternative charges, and 
using substantial assistance motions improperly”). 
 127 See, e.g., COLE, supra note 72, at 112 (discussing ways in which “The prosecuting 
attorney using his discretionary powers influences the ways laws are enforced”); KENNETH CULP 
DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 17 (1969) (“Rules without discretion 
cannot fully take into account the need for tailoring results to unique facts and circumstances of 
particularized cases”); JACOBY, supra note 1, at 3 (analyzing the use of prosecutorial charging 
and sentencing discretion to apply laws appropriately to individual defendants); James 
Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DUKE L. J. 651, 678 
(1976) (“The prosecutor’s decision whether and what to charge is the broadest discretionary 
power in criminal administration”); Zacharias, supra note 93, at 1136 (noting that the exercise of 
plea bargaining “limit[s] the effects of rigid legislation”). 
 128 A rare example of a statute that does set forth standards of prosecutorial 
decisionmaking is the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
5031-5042, which governs the Attorney General’s decision of whether to exercise federal 
jurisdiction in a juvenile prosecution. See United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 300 (5th 
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expectation that prosecutors will fully enforce the law or because the legislators wish to condemn 
the prohibited conduct for symbolic reasons, without forming concrete expectations regarding 
enforcement. In the absence of a legislative command, criminal law theory has never 
presupposed a default legislative intent regarding enforcement.  
 As a practical matter, therefore, the sub-principle that prosecutors must obey the 
legislative will at best can serve as a minimum, non-exclusive guide for prosecutorial behavior: 
prosecutors may not directly defy legislative directives when those can be discerned. This guide 
only will prove useful in a limited number of cases. 
 Implementation of even this narrow sub-principle may be difficult. Consider, first, the 
extreme example of a prosecutor who categorically refuses to enforce a particular law – for 
example, refusing to seek the death penalty on moral or general policy grounds. This 
prosecutor’s action may contradict the legislative expectation that the law, at least sometimes, 
will be implemented.129 Under the neutral sub-principle, the prosecutor should not be permitted 
to overrule the legislature’s will, both because doing so is ultra vires and because that would 
allow public policy to be implemented differently by each prosecutor in the jurisdiction.130  
 In less extreme circumstances, however, it is impossible to extrapolate the legislate will. 
With respect to almost every law, the legislature anticipates that prosecutors will determine who 
to prosecute, who to plea bargain with, and what sentences to propose.131 One thus cannot 
                                                                                                                                                             
Cir. 1997) (holding that the Attorney General’s certification of a “substantial Federal interest” 
warranting the exercise of federal jurisdiction is not subject to judicial review); Robert Mahini, 
Note, There’s No Place Like Home: The Availability of Judicial Review Over Certification 
Decisions Invoking Federal Jurisdiction under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
Act, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1311 (2000). With respect to state prosecutors’ discretionary decision 
whether to try minors as juveniles or adults, see Catherine R. Guttman, Note, Listen to the 
Children: The Decision to Transfer Juveniles to Adult Court, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507 
(1995).  
 129 See, e.g., DeMay, supra note 77, at 806-08 (1999) (discussing, inter alia, possible 
controls on prosecutors who refuse to seek the death penalty under any circumstances). 
 130 Similarly, consider how a prosecutor might react to a recent legislative decision to 
adopt another strict form of punishment: a three-strikes law. Defendants’ interests always will 
conflict with implementation of the law. In any individual case, a prosecutor may have 
independent, potentially legitimate reasons for opposing implementation – notions of fairness, 
concerns about constitutionality, and neutral law enforcement concerns. Yet one can offer at 
least a fair argument that the prosecutor’s role does not include the right to nullify the legislation. 
In the end, our dilemma is that the objective neutrality principles (such as the commitment to 
legislative decisionmaking) cannot coexist with the competing conceptions that envision 
prosecutorial flexibility, but in some contexts seem equally valid as a normative matter. 
 131 Because prosecutorial resources are finite, the decision to enforce a statute fully, by 
definition, constitutes a decision not to enforce other statutes fully. Accordingly, legislatures 
ordinarily must assume that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion will spread resources 
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determine when a decision not to prosecute fully is consistent with the legislature’s ostensible 
desire to punish. 132  
 Moreover, expressions of the legislative will, when they can be ascertained, are not 
typically crystal clear – temporally (i.e., what a legislature wishes 3 or 10 years after its 
enactment of a law)133 or internally (i.e., what different proponents of the legislation 
anticipated).134 In the case of the death penalty statute, for example, the legislature at the time of 
adoption may have expected that the law would be enforced because it believed that there was a 
societal consensus in favor of the death penalty, that the statute could be fairly implemented, and 
that the death penalty serves as a deterrent. But the legisla ture may also have understood that, if 
these assumptions are proven to be erroneous or inapplicable in a particular district or at a 
particular time, a prosecutor would have latitude not to implement the law.  
 Strong proponents of prosecutorial discretion may dispute the preeminence of legislative 
will on theoretical grounds as well. One can make a case for the position that elected prosecutors 
should serve as check on legislatures and should play an independent role in shaping the law. 135  
                                                                                                                                                             
appropriately. 
 132 Conversely, the mere fact that a statute is on the books should not establish a 
justification for particular decisions to prosecute, because the presence of the statute does not, by 
itself, illustrate a legislative desire for full enforcement. 
 133 See Cates, supra note 21, at 3-6 (discussing prosecutions under obsolete statutes). The 
U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that the failure to repeal even dormant laws suggests a 
legislative desire to have the laws enforced. See District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 
346 U.S. 100, 117 (1953) (holding that long-term disuse does “not bear on the continuing 
validity of the law; it is only an ameliorating factor in enforcement”); see also R.I. Ass'n of 
Realtors v. Whitehouse, 199 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding a credible threat of prosecution 
under an unenforced statute because it had been adopted “only twenty years ago”); but cf. Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, (1961) (finding lack of justiciability of a cha llenge to a dormant statute on 
the grounds that 80 years of non-enforcement constituted a “tacit agreement” not to prosecute 
under the law). Commentators have questioned that conclusion. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
JEROLD H. ISRAEL, AND NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §13.5 at 689 (3rd ed. 2000) 
(noting criticism of the Supreme Court’s conclusions); see also Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 
1230, 1253 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that whether a statute has “fallen into desuetude” is a factor 
bearing on a police officer’s good faith in believing actions based on a statute are appropriate). 
 134 See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) (noting the difficulties 
inherent in focusing on legislative motives, including the problem of identifying the true 
legislative intent when legislators differ in their views). 
 135 See supra text accompanying note 123-128. There may also be an issue of whether 
individual prosecutors, rather than the prosecutors’ offices, should develop law enforcement 
policy. But for purposes of our discussion here, we are referring to the highest prosecuting 
officer – for example, the federal or state Attorney General or the elected district attorney. 
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 Consider, for example, a prosecutor employed in Texas immediately before the Supreme 
Court struck down the state’s law governing consensual sexual relations by homosexual 
couples.136 Under the legislative-obeisance sub-principle, the prosecutor might have had no 
leeway to decline enforcement. Arguably, however, the prosecutor should have been able to 
anticipate the Supreme Court’s decision and been able to conclude that the specific legislative 
intent was superceded by general principles governing prosecutors’ charging discretion. 137 The 
prosecutor might, for example, have determined that limits on prosecutorial resources justify 
non-enforcement in cases in which a conviction is likely to be overturned.138 Moreover, 
regardless of the predicted outcome of the case on constitutiona l grounds, the prosecutor 
arguably should have recognized that the law was premised on a popular bias based on sexual 
orientation that should not be given effect through the prosecution’s exercise of criminal law 
enforcement power. The prosecutor in question may have failed to act neutrally, or may have 
exhibited bias, by disregarding these countervailing considerations.139 
 
2. Principled Decisionmaking Rooted in the Purposes of Criminal Law 
 
 One might be able to construct a theory requiring neutral prosecutors to rely solely on 
considerations internal to the justice system or, conversely, to avoid considerations extraneous to 
the system. At its simplest level, this theory would suggest that prosecutors must confine their 
decisionmaking criteria to a combination of resource considerations and policy considerations 
                                                 
 136 Lawrence v. Texas, __ U.S. __, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003). 
 137 Alternatively, the prosecutor might have relied on other neutral criminal law 
principles that suggest prosecutions should be reserved for cases most deserving of prosecution, 
including cases involving conduct that can and should be deterred, very harmful conduct, or 
conduct about which there is clear societal consensus.  
 138 Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, __ U.S. __, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2498 (2003) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“Punishing someone for expressing his sexual preference through noncommercial 
consensual conduct with another adult does not appear to be a worthy way to expend valuable 
law enforcement resources”). 
 139 After-the-fact, a Texas prosecutor who participated in the case acknowledged that the 
prosecution departed from traditional prosecutorial priorities. See Dean E. Murphy, The Supreme 
Court: The Reaction; Gays Celebrate, and Plan Campaign for Broader Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 
27, 2003, p. A20 (quoting an assistant district attorney who participated at the appellate level: 
"Obviously I am a little bit disappointed in the outcome because of the amount of work we put 
into it . . .. But I have a lot more serious criminal offenses in files on my desk than this . . .. It is 
going to be something of a relief to leave the social implications and philosophy and all that 
behind, and just focus on putting the bad guys in prison."). 
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that drive the justifications for punishment.140 This contrasts with the notion that prosecutors may 
pursue policy agendas that ordinarily are the bailiwick of the legislature or other agencies of 
government.141  
 This vision of neutrality might encompass, or legitimate, second-order principles to 
which prosecutors should aspire. Arguably, for example, neutral prosecutors should commit 
themselves in all their actions to the axiom that the guilty should be convicted and the innocent 
acquitted.142 Neutral prosecutors might be required to exercise discretion solely for the purpose 
of maximizing deterrence. Or, more vaguely, they might be required to strive for the imposition 
of “just deserts.”143 Each of these sub-principles is a subset of the general notion that criminal 
law is exclusively concerned with convicting truly guilty persons, in a constitutionally 
permissible way, for the purposes of incapacitating criminals and deterring crime.144 
 In practice, the contours of this approach are unclear. Depending upon how one phrases 
the second-order principles, they may become of little use. The preference for “just deserts”, for 
example, is deeply rooted in the tradition of American criminal procedure. Yet what is just is so 
malleable a criterion that it enables prosecutors to justify almost any action. 145 
 The phrasing of the principles may also, advertently or inadvertently, incorporate 
assumptions or presumptions that have nothing to do with the enterprise of focusing 
decisionmaking on criminal law functions. Consider, for example, the emphasis on punishing 
only the guilty. At one level, our justice system accepts the premise that it is preferable to allow 
some number of innocent persons to go free in order to assure that no innocent person is 
                                                 
 140 For example, the maximization of deterrence, imposing appropriate punishment, 
incapacitating dangerous defendants, and facilitating rehabilitation. See Fred C. Zacharias, The 
Purposes of Discipline, __ WM. & MARY L .REV. __, __ (2003) (discussing the purposes of 
criminal law sanctions). 
 141 See infra text accompanying note 161. 
 142 See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“It is as much [the 
prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction 
as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one”). 
 143 See McTigue, supra note 40, at 671 (“the public generally views police officers, and 
to a lesser extent prosecutors, as neutral parties who seek to protect community safety and are 
only interested in a just result”). 
 144 See Richman, supra note 115, at 957-59 (“On one hand, we celebrate the professional 
independence of prosecutors. We expect them to set their priorities based on such considerations 
as the responsiveness of a social problem to criminal sanctions, the nature of the harm, and the 
maximization of deterrence. . . ).  
 145 In this sense, the concept of fairness is akin to the commonly cited principle that 
prosecutors must serve “justice”. See Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics, supra note 93, at 48 
(discussing the meaning of prosecutorial justice at the trial stage). 
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convicted.146 This may, however, not be consistent with the emphasis of criminal theory on the 
imposition of just deserts, which would deem mistakes in either direction to be equally 
undesirable.147  
 There are, of course, powerful practical arguments in favor of imposing a gatekeeper role 
upon prosecutors, some empirical, 148 others having to do with the prosecutor’s unique access to 
information. 149 The punitive nature of the criminal process, in which cost and stigma are imposed 
                                                 
 146 The aphorism that it is “better that ten guilty persons escape, than one innocent suffer” 
first appeared in 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 358 
(1765). See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is “bottomed on a fundamental value 
determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty 
man go free”); accord Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 , 380, 393 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
concurring); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 61, 73 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
 147 See, e.g., Larry Glasser, Note, The American Exclusionary Rule Debate: Looking to 
England and Canada for Guidance, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L REV. 159, 189 (2003) (“Although it 
may very well be better to let ten guilty suspects go free than to convict one innocent suspect, the 
goal of the criminal justice system should be to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent”); Erik 
Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and The Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 85, 104 (2002) (quantitatively based article challenging Blackstone’s premise); 
Alexander Volokh, N Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 175 (1997) (questioning the 
proposition that society should let 10 guilty men go free to protect against incorrectly convicting 
one innocent man); cf. Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” 
Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 911 (2002) (“consequentialist theories justify intentional 
punishment of the innocent and are unable to explain the wrong of doing so”); Jeffrey Reiman & 
Ernest Van Den Haag, On the Common Saying that it is Better that Ten Guilty Persons Escape 
than that One Innocent Suffer: Pro and Con, in ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, FRED MILLER JR., & 
JEFFREY PAUL, CRIME, CULPABILITY, AND REMEDY 234, 235 (1990) (evaluating the utilitarian 
arguments against Blackstone’s premise).   
 148 The empirical claim posits a substantial likelihood of error in the criminal process, 
which suggests that safeguards involving prosecutorial action may be necessary if our ideals are 
to be satisfied. Society might want prosecutors to screen cases not because of any special 
prosecutorial competence, but simply out of a desire to impose some additional obstacle in the 
way of potentially faulty convictions. In other words, the preference for avoiding erroneous 
convictions may lead society to assign prosecutors the function of serving as a check – officials 
who take second look at the evidence the police already considered in deciding to recommend 
prosecution. 
 149 In other words, without the prosecutor’s action, some information may never become 
available to the fact-finder or the defense. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 648 
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (justifying the prosecutorial duty to disclose information under Brady v. 
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upon defendants whether or not they ultimately are exonerated, may justify requiring prosecutors 
to screen prosecutions with a special emphasis on the possibility of innocence.150 But these 
concerns do not explain the normative judgment that it is just or “neutral” for prosecutors to 
dismiss cases of defendants likely to be guilty. 
 The tension between the “imposing just deserts” and “protecting the innocent” principles 
highlights another, practical difficulty of relying upon norms such as these to identify appropriate 
exercises of prosecutorial discretion. Even if we recognize protection of the innocent as a 
compelling ideal, the implementation of that ideal may not be achieved best through the adoption 
of a decisionmaking principle that focuses directly on the rights of falsely accused defendants.151 
Society may be willing to rely on other actors present at trial to serve the function of evaluating 
the evidence and correcting misperceptions that derive from prosecutors’ lack of neutrality. 152 
                                                                                                                                                             
Maryland on the basis that much “relevant material . . ., because of imbalance in investigative 
resources, will be exclusively in the hands of the Government”). The factfinders, for example, 
ordinarily never learn about inadmissible evidence, evidence that has not been produced in 
discovery, and impressions that prosecutors form based upon witness interviews and witness 
preparation. 
 150 See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2141 
(1987) (“Even if a defendant is ultimately acquitted, forced immersion in criminal investigation 
and adjudication is a wrenching disruption of everyday life. For this reason, we must have 
assurance that those who would wield this power will be guided solely by their sense of public 
responsibility for the attainment of justice.”); cf. Fred C. Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal 
Distinction in Professional Responsibility, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISSUES 165, 172-76 (questioning 
whether criminal cases are inherently distinctive). 
 151 Mandating a defendant-protective mindset will not necessarily serve the goals of the 
criminal justice system. One might just as easily take the view that the process works most 
efficiently – and protects the innocent most effectively – when prosecutors act as advocates in 
favor of criminal convictions and let the criminal justice process weed out the unworthy cases.  
Indeed, if neutral prosecutors are expected to focus on the potential innocence of defendants, it 
may be necessary to carve out special sub-principles for different stages of prosecutors’ work – 
especially the trial stage. Prosecutors who emphasize accuracy at trial may second-guess their 
advocacy in a way that undermines their effectiveness as instruments in the truthseeking process. 
To the extent society binds prosecutors’ offices to the task of assessing innocence at the same 
time as it seeks to establish guilt, chief prosecutors may need to divide these responsibilities 
among different actors within their offices. See Uviller, supra note 40, at 1697 (inquiring 
whether society has “imposed fundamentally inconsistent obligations on our prosecutors, 
bending them into psychological pretzels by requiring them to be the neutral investigator and the 
‘quasi-judicial’ adjudicator”). 
 152 Namely, the judge and the jury, and defense counsel. See Zacharias, Structuring the 
Ethics, supra note 93, at 60 (suggesting that prosecutors must strive only for “adversarially 
correct results”); cf. Schwarzer, supra note 105, at 407 (questioning the allocation of authority 
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The validity of the underlying norm to the criminal justice system does not necessarily translate 
into behavioral directives inherent in the prosecutor’s role. 
 
3. Principled Policy-making 
 
 An alternative conception of principled neutrality is simply that neutral prosecutors’ 
offices will constrain their own exercise of discretion, and the potential for arbitrariness, through 
the adoption of administrative policies that govern categories of cases. In part, this is the 
approach followed, to a limited extent, in the Department of Justice’s U.S. Attorney’s Manual. 
By identifying specific criteria on which decisions will be based, such guidelines promote 
consistency and expose the decisionmaking criteria to public debate and review. 153 
 This view of neutral decisionmaking seems incomplete, however, for at least two reasons. 
First, it says nothing about the legitimacy of the reasons for the particular office policy. Second, 
it does not necessarily presuppose consistency among various policies. The mere fact that any 
given charging policy, or other decisionmaking policy, is consistently applied does not mean that 
decisionmaking in a prosecutor’s office is made on a coherent, defensible basis. 
 Consider, for example, the U.S. Attorney General’s recently articulated policy requiring 
federal prosecutors, in charging a defendant, generally to bring the harshest charges that can be 
readily proven. 154 The policy has been explained as promoting consistency and transparency. But 
one might ask whether there is a defensible justification for uniformly charging defendants as 
harshly as possible, rather than pursuing other equally transparent approaches that also promote 
consistency. 
 The best rationale is that lawbreakers should be punished as harshly as possible in order 
to maximize deterrence and retribution, and that charging all provable offenses helps ensure 
maximum punishment.155 Yet federal prosecutors do not act on this premise in other aspects of 
their work. Prosecutors frequently decline to file charges at all when they conclude that 
                                                                                                                                                             
under the federal sentencing guidelines” to “advocator prosecutors” rather than “neutral judges”). 
 153 A critical analysis of the U.S. Attorney’s Manual is beyond this Article’s scope. It is 
fair to conclude, however, that the manual fails to offer a complete, coherent and consistent 
account of how prosecutors should make discretionary decisions. With respect to many specific 
issues, it either offers scant guidance or announces a categorical policy that may not accord with 
ordinary decisionmaking principles.  
 154 Memorandum of Attorney General John Ashcroft re “Department Policy Concerning 
Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing.” It is uncertain whether 
the policy is new or whether the Department has simply re-articulated a policy that has been 
understood to exist since the adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 
 155 It is important to note that this rationale is inconsistent with the traditional notion that 
“punishment should fit the crime.” Because of this inconsistency, it is unlikely that the 
Department of Justice would invoke the principle of maximizing punishment to justify the new 
policy. 
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prosecution would be undeservedly harsh, even in instances in which federal crimes can easily 
be proven. 156 In cases of white-collar crimes, prosecutors often leave cases to be pursued civilly. 
Prosecutors also routinely exchange non-prosecution for defendants’ agreement to make 
restitution or to abide by conditions of diversion. The current prosecutorial policy 
notwithstanding, federal prosecutors thus have relied heavily, and will no doubt continue to rely, 
on the notion of individualized justice that results in proportionate treatment of offenders. 
 A second possible rationale for the new policy is that constraining federal prosecutors’ 
discretion to limit charges implements the congressional intent that each federal criminal law be 
fully enforced. As we have already discussed, however, it is not clear that Congress in fact has 
ever expected its laws to be enforced rigidly, or has intended to relegate prosecutors to a purely 
ministerial role.157 Moreover, federal prosecutors do not act on the premise that criminal laws 
must be fully enforced in other aspects of their work. Virtually all federal crimes are prosecuted 
selectively. 
 In short, the current federal policy illustrates that the adoption of administrative policies 
do not invariably ensure “principled” decisionmaking in a broader sense. Policies may promote 
some degree of consistency, though that will not always be the case.158 More importantly, the 
mere adoption of a policy does not ensure the legitimacy of the mandated prosecutorial action 
because the policy will not automatically rest upon a legitimate principle that justifies the 
policy. 159  
                                                 
 156 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobo-Zavala, 241 F.3d 1009, 1011 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting 
a prosecutor’s agreement to dismissal of federal narcotics charges in favor of the filing of state 
narcotics charges “because the penalty in state court was, in her opinion, sufficient punishment 
for the defendants’ crimes”). The Department’s internal guidelines specifically provide that 
charges should be filed only when a “substantial federal interest would be served by prosecution” 
and that in deciding whether to decline to bring charges, prosecutors should consider “[t]he 
nature and seriousness of the offense,” “[t]he deterrent effect of prosecution,” and “[t]he person’s 
culpability in connection with the offense.” U.S.A.M. §§ 9-27.220 & 9-27.230. See United States 
v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 305-06 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing the Department of Justice 
guidelines and observing that prosecutors’ charging decisions are ill-suited to judicial review 
because “[s]uch factors as . . . the prosecution’s general deterrence value” are not readily 
susceptible to judicial analysis).  
 157 See supra text accompanying note 128. 
 158 Indeed, the Attorney General’s new policy, while relying on the desire for 
transparency and consistency in charging, may in fact mask exercises of discretion that occur at 
the pre-charging stage (e.g., in declining to bring charges at all) or in evaluating whether crimes 
with particularly severe penalties are “readily provable” and therefore must be charged.   
 159 It is important to remember that categorical policies may create only the venire of 
consistency. In practice they often are under- or over- inclusive, with the result that they disregard 
alternative considerations that prosecutors ought to, or may in fact, apply. Ultimately, specific 
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4. Non-criminal law rationales 
 
 If neutrality means that prosecutors must make principled decisions, an important issue is 
whether the applicable decisionmaking criteria must be based on criminal law rationales. As a 
purely theoretical matter, when prosecutors implement criminal law to achieve non-criminal law 
objectives, they depart from their core functions. The neutrality principle arguably requires them 
to avoid entering the realm of politics and public policy.  
 The resolution of this issue has broad practical significance. It can affect recurring 
dilemmas, such as whether a municipal prosecutor may use a pending or threatened prosecution 
to gain leverage in a civil action by or against the municipality.160 More broadly, it has bearing 
on how prosecutors should view their role as public servants. May a state or federal prosecutor 
use her authority to promote the interests of another branch of government?161 
 In the real world, prosecutors do not consider themselves to be inordinately constrained 
in the policies they may implement. Prosecutors typically see themselves as executive branch 
officials who are free to promote any legitimate government objective.162 Some prosecution 
                                                                                                                                                             
office policies may be justifiable, but should be tested against whatever principles and sub-
principles that one believes should govern prosecutorial decisionmaking generally.  
 160 See Seth F. Kreimer, Releases, Redress and Police Misconduct: Reflections on 
Agreements to Waive Civil Rights Actions in Exchange for Dismissal of Civil Rights Charges, 
136 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 902 (1988) (“Adversaries, courts, and citizens expect the prosecutor to 
be a guardian of the interests of justice. . . . [T]his impartial, if not neutral, role [arguably] is 
threatened by the release-dismissal practice, which injects the issue of civil liability into the 
criminal decisions”); Zacharias, supra note 17, at ___ n.149 (collecting and analyzing cases 
addressing the practice of conditioning prosecutorial decisions on a defendant’s willingness to 
forego a civil suit). Similarly, may an office rest prosecution decisions on whether convictions 
are likely to produce the forfeiture of significant assets to the state? Steffanie Stracke, The 
Criminal Activity Forfeiture Act: Replete with Constitutional Violations, 57 MO. L. REV. 909, 
919 (1992) (arguing that prosecutors often have a conflict of interest and should recuse 
themselves from plea bargaining when the application of forfeiture provisions are at issue). 
Arguably, both types of decisions are akin to other prosecutorial decisions that rest on 
considerations of resource preservation or maximization.  
 161 One’s view of appropriate prosecutorial conduct may vary depending upon the 
context. One might, for example, take the position that a prosecutor must steadfastly remain 
neutral (in the sense of focusing solely on law enforcement concerns) in deciding to commence a 
prosecution but that she may consider other policy considerations in declining or terminating a 
prosecution. 
 162 Cf. Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Note, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison 
v. Olson and the Framers’ Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069, 1087 (1990) (“early Federal prosecutorial 
practice parallels the Framers' intent which emerges from the Constitution and related records: 
The Founding Fathers did not conceive of prosecution as the exclusive function of the President, 
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agencies, particularly the federal Department of Justice, assume that Congress has assigned them 
functions that extend beyond criminal prosecutions (e.g., foreign policy functions). 
 Of course, it is often difficult to distinguish between criminal law and non-criminal law 
objectives. Investigations into terrorism, for example, bridge the gap between enforcement of 
domestic criminal law, promoting ongoing war efforts, and the conduct of foreign policy. A 
prosecutorial focus on international money laundering likewise can be viewed in a variety of 
ways. 
 At the very least, however, one can reasonably posit that neutral prosecutors should 
confine themselves to implementing principles, sub-principles, or policies that have something to 
do with legitimate public-policy interests of their jurisdiction. This approach would exclude the 
pursuit of objectives unrelated to the sovereignty served by the particular prosecutor. States and 
localities would have no foreign-policy jurisdiction; 163 federal prosecutors might be limited in 
addressing purely state concerns. 
 
B. The Usefulness of Relying on the Concept of Principled Decisionmaking 
 
 No one would dispute the theoretical benefits of principled prosecutorial decisionmaking. 
Yet one should not underestimate the difficulty of identifying meaningful criteria for 
prosecutorial decisionmaking that are both universally acceptable and workable. On the one 
hand, at too great a level of generality, sub-principles may be broadly recognized but offer little 
guidance. The most frequently espoused sub-principle, for example, is also the most fungible and 
least workable; namely, that a prosecutor must act fairly in making discretionary decisions. 
 On the other hand, highly specific sub-principles of decisionmaking are likely to offer 
more guidance, but also engender more debate. As we have seen, most observers would accept 
the broad notion that prosecutors should try to avoid punishing innocent defendants.164 But 
narrower sub-principles that follow from this cannot generate a consensus.165 The same holds 
true for standards prosecutors might adopt to govern the level of belief they must hold before 
                                                                                                                                                             
nor even of the executive branch”). 
 163 Thus, for example, a local prosecutor could not decline to prosecute certain foreign 
nationals in order to avoid offending an allied nation. Nor could she target foreign nationals in 
retaliation for their country’s treatment of U.S. citizens. 
 164 See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“It is as much [the 
prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction 
as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one”). 
 165 To what extent, for example, must prosecutors screen cases to avoid prosecuting 
innocent people? May a prosecutor initiate proceedings based on as little as “probable cause” to 
believe an individual committed a crime or, at the other end of the spectrum, must a prosecutor 
be “morally certain” of guilt before bringing charges? See, e.g., United States v. Ramming, 915 
F. Supp. 854 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (opining that prosecution had “an obligation . . . to not prosecute 
where the evidence at best is disputed”).  
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acting on a convicted defendant’s behalf.166 
 Even if one can identify noncontroversial and specific decisionmaking criteria, these still 
may fail to shape appropriate prosecutorial decisionmaking. Consider a sub-principle that many 
would accept: that punishment should fit the crime.167 Although the proportionality standard is 
clear, the meaning of proportionality varies with the context. A prosecutor who, for example, 
concludes that the death penalty in a particular murder case would be disproportionately harsh 
might nevertheless initiate a capital charge to gain leverage in plea bargaining. In this setting, the 
prosecutor can take the position that a death sentence might be disproportionately harsh but, 
because overcharging helps lead to appropriate punishment, a death indictment is proportionate. 
 Moreover, many so-called neutral sub-principles that seem useful and broadly acceptable 
will push in opposite directions when applied to specific cases. Selective prosecution within 
particular categories of crime, for example, may serve the maximization of deterrence and the 
preservation of resources but, at the same time, clash with the standards of proportionality and 
consistency. 168 Likewise, implementing the legislative will to fully enforce, or not enforce, 
particular crimes (or to enforce them in a particular way) may undermine traditional principles 
associated with criminal law concerns. 
 
C. Initial Conclusions About Neutrality as Principled Decisionmaking 
 
 The notion that prosecutors should make principled decisions can be conceptualized as a 
separate dimension of neutrality, but it also represents an assumption implicit in other 
dimensions that we have identified. Many of the conceptions of neutrality to which this Article 
has alluded could be classified as sub-principles. At a minimum, they suggest that neutral 
                                                 
 166 That is, when must prosecutors take steps to overturn wrongful convictions? See 
Zacharias, supra note 17, at ___ (discussing prosecutors’ obligations after a conviction is 
complete). 
 167 Some might say that questions of punishment should be left to the judge. At this point, 
however, most accept that prosecutors may legitimately make decisions that influence, if not 
determine, what sentence will be imposed. Insofar as prosecutors make those decisions – e.g., by 
initiating charges that carry mandatory minimum sentences or by agreeing to drop charges or 
recommend a particular sentence in exchange for a guilty plea – it may be argued that 
prosecutors should make them in a principled way.  
 168 Federal prosecutions for insider trading are a good example. Prosecutors lack 
resources to prosecute all instances of insider trading and recognize that, perhaps unlike murder 
cases, it is unnecessary to prosecute them all. Private civil actions and S.E.C. investigations 
provide penalties in unprosecuted cases, with the result that criminal prosecution in the most 
visible cases adequately serves the need for deterrence. But if most persons who engage in 
insider trading are sanctioned civilly, criminal punishment may seem to be disproportionately 
harsh. And in the absence of some principle for determining which violators of securities law are 
most deserving of punishment, selective prosecution seems arbitrary. 
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principles or sub-principles exist and should govern prosecutorial discretion. For example, the 
idea of nonbiased prosecution not only means that there are illegitimate criteria for 
decisionmaking but, conversely, also suggests the existence of legitimate criteria. 
Nonpartisanship likewise presupposes that there are decisionmaking criteria that can be applied 
independently and objectively in individual cases.  
 Therefore, vague though the concept of prosecutorial neutrality may be and however it is 
conceptualized, the various dimensions of prosecutorial neutrality do share an underlying 
premise that prosecutors can, and should, exercise their discretion in a nonarbitrary fashion. 
Defining the sub-principles and other criteria governing decisionmaking and establishing 
priorities among them is a daunting task, yet any conception of prosecutorial neutrality seems to 
demand that this work be done.  
 That is not to say that identifying sub-principles of prosecutorial decisionmaking 
automatically would enable the public to assess individual prosecutors’ work. Much of what 
prosecutors do inevitably remains hidden. Moreover, to the extent that some neutral principles 
target prosecutors’ motives, those will be of limited utility for public oversight, because 
prosecutors’ motivation usually is unascertainable.169 Nevertheless, articulating principles and 
sub-principles of prosecution has value. It can make the exercise of discretion more thoughtful 
and systematic, enable well- intentioned prosecutors to reach decisions with reference to 
impersonal norms, narrow inconsistency within a prosecutor’s office, and facilitate review by 
supervisory prosecutors. Though the public may not always be in a position to assess 
prosecutors’ application of the decisionmaking criteria in individual cases, identifying the criteria 
at a minimum allows the public to evaluate the office’s general approach. 
 
V. THE THREE-DIMENSIONAL NEUTRAL PROSECUTOR 
 
 The foregoing analysis illustrates that commentators have used the term “neutrality” to 
describe several different limitations on discretionary prosecutorial decisionmaking. The 
question naturally arises of whether the different conceptions can co-exist. In other words, is it 
possible for a prosecutor to satisfy all three dimensions of neutrality simultaneously? 
  
A. Commonalities Among the Different Conceptions of Neutrality 
 
 At the most abstract level, the different dimensions are reconcilable. A three-dimensional 
                                                 
 169 Consider, for example, the principle that prosecutors should not use the criminal 
justice process to penalize persons who have not yet been convicted. Under this principle, 
prosecutors should not authorize searches to harass a person; prosecutors should not oppose bail 
merely to punish defendants by incarcerating them before trial; prosecutors should not indict 
simply to subject defendants them to the anxiety and expense of a trial. Cf. Freedberg v. United 
States Department of Justice, 703 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1988) (enjoining simultaneous obscenity 
prosecutions of business owner in four different federal districts). But insofar as a prosecutor can 
point to legitimate justifications for her actions, it ordinarily will be impossible to discern 
whether she has acted for a permissible or impermissible purpose. 
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“neutral prosecutor” simply would need to remain non-biased, nonpartisan, and principled. This 
prosecutor would ignore impermissible considerations such as race, gender and religion, self-
interest, personal beliefs, and party politics. Her frame of mind would be independent, objective, 
and non-political. She would need to act in a non-arbitrary fashion, consistently applying 
decision-making criteria derived from societally acceptable sources.  
 Indeed, the three dimensions of neutrality contain common threads. First, each dimension 
reflects the notion that prosecutorial decisionmaking should be depersonalized. When, for 
example, one says that prosecutors may not rely upon their own beliefs, must be objective, and 
must apply societally acceptable principles, one is describing an approach to criminal justice 
administration that aims at elevating legal and professional decisionmaking criteria over 
individual preferences. Depersonalization of decisionmaking, ideally, would lead all prosecutors 
to act consistently in like situations regardless of their biographies, predispositions, and 
idiosyncracies. A prosecutor arguably acts neutrally when she reaches the same decision that 
other prosecutors would, and should, reach.  
 Second, the three dimensions all reflect the idea that prosecutors should make decisions 
abstractly or “noncontextually” – intellectually removed from the immediate controversy in 
which the issues arise. The non-biased prosecutor, for example, should disregard impermissible 
considerations, even those that appear to animate the community’s views or the law itself. The 
nonpartisan prosecutor should ignore a momentary hue and cry. The principled prosecutor 
should consistently make decisions by reference to a set of generalized, deeply-rooted 
decisionmaking norms.  
 Third, the three dimensions suggest that the neutral prosecutor must be accountable to the 
public, in the broadest sense. The non-biased prosecutor disregards personal beliefs in favor of 
public values and ignores the desires of her political party in order to represent the entire 
citizenry. The nonpartisan prosecutor makes decisions independently of the police, the victim 
and the voting public, in order to give appropriate respect and weight to the legitimate interests 
of all of her constituents (including the defendant). The principled prosecutor gives due weight to 
public expectations and values as expressed in particular criminal legislation and in the broad 
expectations of the criminal justice system.  
 That these themes cut across commentators’ different conceptions suggests that 
“neutrality” offers a coherent account of how prosecutors should behave. As the following 
sections will suggest, however, the themes themselves, both in theory and practice, are in 
tension.  
 
B. Tension Between Decontextualized and Depersonalized Decisionmaking 
 
 Decontextualized decisionmaking – decisionmaking divorced from the immediate context 
in which issues arise – may be in tension with depersonalized decisionmaking. 
Decontextualization suggests that decisions should be made without regard for the demands and 
expectations of a public constituency that is divided in its desires and that is motivated by 
impermissible prejudices and momentary passions. Accordingly, the prosecutor must look 
elsewhere for decisionmaking criteria. The likely alternative source of standards is the 
prosecutor’s own value system – her beliefs about what decisions will best serve the public good. 
This risks idiosyncratic subjective judgments that are inconsistent with the notion of 
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depersonalized decisionmaking.  
 In theory, a “neutral” prosecutor might avoid this dilemma by making decisions based on 
external, objective criteria that are based neither on momentary public expectations about a 
particular case nor personal beliefs. In particular, the prosecutor would strive to implement 
deeply-rooted and broadly-accepted decisionmaking principles or sub-principles. The difficulty 
is that there are few universally-accepted objective criteria for making decisions and prosecutors 
have not collectively attempted to derive useful standards (e.g., from the criminal law and 
criminal justice system) and then articulate those principles. A chief prosecutor or other 
supervisory prosecutors might choose from among possible, and competing, principles and 
communicate them throughout the office, but this is rarely done. Likewise, few if any 
prosecutors’ offices explicitly deliberate and record the reasons for their decisions. In the 
absence of codified principles or prosecutorial common law, individual prosecutors typically 
must identify the relevant criteria themselves.170 The process of selecting from among equally 
justifiable norms raises the specter of personalized, value- laden choices. 
 These concerns are illustrated by the everyday case of a prosecutor deciding how to 
proceed against an immigrant woman with children who has served as a courier in a large drug-
dealing operation. 171 Initially, the prosecutor may be inclined to base her approach on the general 
views of society regarding the appropriate treatment of such defendants. Upon reflection, 
however, the prosecutor may conclude that the popular view reflects momentary passions and 
prejudices. Contemporary stereotypes about the relative culpability of women in criminal 
organizations (e.g., that women are coerced into playing subordinate roles) and the impact of 
imprisonment on women and their children (e.g., that imprisonment is harsher for women than 
for men) might lead to undue leniency because the prevailing stereotypic assumptions are 
incorrect. Alternatively, contemporary prejudices against immigrants might lead to undue 
harshness relative to drug couriers who are citizens. Respect for the importance of 
decontextualization arguably requires the neutral prosecutor to rely on alternative, though 
depersonalized, standards. 
 So the prosecutor might select a common, seemingly objective standard as her lodestar. 
Suppose, for example, that she vows to base her decisions solely and objectively on the 
defendant’s culpability, because that will lead to proportionate punishment. It is easy to see that 
the generality of this standard will create difficulty for the prosecutor in forming concrete 
decisions. But beyond that inevitable problem, there also is a substantial risk that the standard 
itself is more subjective than it appears. In assessing the defendant’s relative culpability, the 
standard allows the prosecutor to understate the defendant’s role based on stereotypical 
assumptions similar to those inherent in the community view; either that women in drug 
                                                 
 170 In other words, some prosecutor will need to make a personal choice among contested 
principles. 
 171 See, e.g. United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1297-98 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(reviewing district court’s determination that federal prosecutor’s office was violating the rights 
of male defendants who were convicted of transporting narcotics because the office “was 
enforcing the drug laws in a manner that was both quirky and favorable to female defendants”). 
55
Zacharias and Green:




operations play a minor role or are exploited or coerced into participation or that immigrant drug 
couriers are somehow more blameworthy than drug couriers who are United States citizens. 
 Assume, therefore, that, in the interest of preserving depersonalized decisionmaking, the 
chief prosecutor announces office policies that exclude the defendant’s gender and immigration 
status entirely from consideration. That would be the effect, for example, of rules requiring 
assistant prosecutors to (1) bring the most serious charge that the evidence allows and seeking 
the harshest available sentence in all drug-courier cases,172 or (2) seek a particular sentence (say, 
ten years’ imprisonment) in all drug-courier cases regardless of the particular circumstances. Of 
course, the selection of these rules over others is, in some sense, arbitrary. It is unclear what 
principle underlies their selection. Yet the fear of contextualization and the demand for less 
personalization in decisionmaking may require some artificiality in the interest of applying 
manageable, objective standards. 
 Nevertheless, the adoption of such focused policies gives rise to a broader problem, 
particularly when combined with the absence of an office common law. It may be difficult to 
square the selected policies with other standards that also are being, or have been, emphasized 
within the same office. For example, if the office’s ordinary practice is to take the defendant’s 
relative culpability into account in deciding whether to charge or what charges to bring, it is hard 
to justify not doing so in drug courier cases. Likewise, if the office’s ordinary practice is to give 
some weight to the legitimate interests of all who will be affected by the prosecutor’s decision, it 
is hard to justify entirely ignoring the impact of a prosecution on the female drug courier’s 
dependent family members. While leading to seemingly consistent treatment of drug couriers, 
the new office rules inexplicably distinguish between drug-courier prosecutions and other 
prosecutions in which case-specific considerations relevant to proportionality and retribution are 
given weight.173  
 Some of the these concerns are inherent in the notion of objective decisionmaking. But 
they ultimately relate, in part, to the interaction between the simultaneous desires for 
depersonalization and the avoidance of case-by-case decisionmaking that is vulnerable to 
momentary demands of the prosecutor’s potentially frenzied or biased constituencies. The call 
for decontextualization pushes in the direction of resort to independent values, which inevitably 
risk personalization in hidden forms. The imposition of rules designed to avoid contextual 
decisionmaking also can mask personal biases of the designator of the rules, can prove arbitrary, 
or in practice can become so difficult to implement consistently that they fail to provide the 
                                                 
 172 This seems to be the Justice Department’s policy on paper, if not in actual practice. 
 173 One might, of course, justify the difference on the basis of administrative necessity. In 
jurisdictions where a prosecutor’s office handles a large number of narcotics cases, categorical 
policies based on such factors as the amount of drugs involved or the number of prior offenses 
are necessary to preserve prosecutorial resources. A practice of making individual charging, plea 
bargaining and sentencing decisions based on a multiplicity of factors would take up too much 
time. Thus, prosecutors might characterize cookie-cutter policies in drug cases as a fair 
resolution of the tension between the need to make individualized decisions and the need to 
preserve prosecutorial resources.  
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objectivity that is their goal. 
 
C. Tension Between Decontextualized Decisionmaking and Public Accountability in 
Decisionmaking 
 
 Decontextualized decisionmaking, at least in part, is inconsistent with the notion of 
public accountability. If a prosecutor ignores public expectations in an effort to avoid being 
swayed by prejudice and irrational excesses, how can the prosecutor serve the public’s will?174 
Public accountability presupposes some form of responsiveness to society’s present-day desires. 
 Consider, for example, a prosecutor called upon to enforce bank fraud legislation adopted 
in the wake of the savings-and- loan scandal of the 1980s,175 or to enforce anti-terrorist legislation 
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The idea that the neutral prosecutor should 
avoid popular prejudices and temper public excesses suggests that the prosecutor should enforce 
these laws circumspectly. In contrast, the publicly-accountable prosecutor probably would 
enforce these laws to the hilt – seeking the harshest allowable penalties, in deference to the 
popular will as reflected in the then-new legislation.  
 
D. Tension between Depersonalized Decisionmaking and Public Accountability in 
Decisionmaking 
 
 Finally, there is a tension between the idea that prosecutorial decisionmaking should be 
impersonal, in the sense that it should be separated from prosecutors’ own self- interest, and the 
idea that prosecutors should be accountable to those general societal preferences that do not stem 
merely from the heat of the moment.176 That tension arises because American society’s 
democratic processes presuppose, to some extent, that self- interest on the part of government 
officials promotes public accountability.  
 Our system of selecting prosecutors suggests that the commitment to public 
                                                 
 174 Richman, supra note 115, at 960 (“Yet for all the apparent confidence in the judgment 
of the professionals, the idea that prosecutors should be broadly responsive to the concerns of 
their community also runs deep. Where reasonable minds might differ on how prosecutorial 
resources might be deployed, community preferences are thought to be critical”). 
 175 See generally Bruce A. Green, After the Fall: The Criminal Law Enforcement 
Response to the S&L Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S155, S173-76 (1991) (discussing Congress’s 
enhancement of criminal penalties for banking crimes in response to the savings-and- loan crisis 
of the 1980s). 
 176 The tension discussed in Section V(C) referred to the issue of how prosecutors might 
react to society’s desires in the midst of a public groundswell. This section addresses the separate 
issue of how depersonalized decisionmaking relates to the question of whether, even assuming 
that prosecutors should ignore frenzied public opinion, they should be accountable to more 
general, impetuous societal preferences. 
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accountability is meant as more than a de minimis constraint requiring objectivity and adherence 
to unambiguous legislative directives. We follow a democratic regime of electing prosecutors, or 
those who appoint prosecutors, for limited terms. We do not give prosecutors life or guaranteed 
tenure, as we do for federal judges. Part of the reason presumably is that prosecutors are more 
likely to satisfy the public’s desires if their decisions have some implications for their careers. 
 A desire for public accountability arguably led Congress to let the federal Independent 
Counsel Act lapse. Congress wanted government corruption cases to be handled by prosecutors 
more answerable to the electorate and the appointing official than independent counsel 
previously selected under the Independent Counsel Act had been. This vision of public 
accountability, however, is in tension with that aspect of depersonalized decisionmaking that 
envisions prosecutors who completely ignore the impact of public reactions on their own career 
interests. 
 There are ways to resolve these issues. Perhaps one should view the system’s focus on 
accountability to be more limited – to emphasize accountability in the sense of performing well, 
according to the precepts of neutral prosecutions. Overall, society may prefer prosecutors who 
engage in depersonalized decisionmaking to those who pander to society’s second-order 
preferences. Neutral prosecutors arguably are those who can cabin and set aside career interests 
in their own minds. Whatever the merits of such approaches, however, it is clear that they 
compete with the apparent systemic bias in favor of prosecutors who heed society’s reactions to 
the results of their decisions. 
 
E. Tensions Within the Dimensions Themselves 
 
 Although the three dimensions of neutrality are theoretically reconcilable,177 tensions 
inevitably develop when the theory is applied to particular cases. We have noted some of the 
tensions earlier, so will not belabor the point here. A few examples, however, highlight the 
problem.  
 Consider a prosecutor in an abortion-related controversy. 178 Being nonpartisan and non-
biased simultaneously may be difficult for her. The interests of at least some of the various 
constituents she “represents” will be religiously based.179 Even if she tries to reach a nonpartisan 
decision, she must, in the end, implement the interests of some constituents – potentially 
favoring one religious perspective over another. Moreover, to the extent the prosecutor’s 
nonpartisan decision rests upon her non-religious moral or public policy views, she arguably also 
acts in biased fashion, because she has emphasized her own values.180 These eventualities may 
                                                 
 177 See supra text accompanying note 168. 
 178 For example, a case involving prosecution under an anti-abortion statute, on the one 
hand, and a case involving a law forbidding protests near abortion clinics, on the other. 
 179 See supra text accompanying note 108. 
 180 Barry M. Horstman, Simon Leis Jr.: He’s Waged a Three-decade Crusade, 
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simply present a problem of perception (i.e., whether observers can determine the prosecutor’s 
actual motivation) or they may reflect actual instances of bias.181 
 In part, this scenario simply illustrates the difficulty of avoiding the appearance of 
religious bias when a case implicates religious considerations. But it also illustrates an inherent 
tension between the non-bias and nonpartisanship conceptions of neutrality. One can argue that 
the prosecutor’s independence from the community is contrary to the idea of non-bias, because 
the authority to reach independent decisions gives too much weight to the prosecutor’s personal 
beliefs which, intentionally or subliminally, always will be implicated in cases such as these.182 
Conversely, however, attempting to remain faithful to the community’s values rather than one’s 
own in cases in which the community is divided could effectively undermine any possibility of 
true nonpartisanship. In practice, some prosecutors probably can perceive and reconcile the 
competing aspects of these dimensions of neutrality, but the tension may lead other prosecutors 
astray. 
 Additional tensions arise among the specific criteria, or sub-principles, that prosecutors 
might rely upon to achieve principled neutrality. Consider, for example, this recurring situation: 
a prosecutor reviews a set of evidence without bias, determines objectively that there is probable 
                                                                                                                                                             
CINCINNATI POST, Dec. 3, 1999, at C1 (describing the statement of Cincinnati prosecutor Simon 
Leis that “In [obscenity] matters . . ., there's no such thing as moral neutrality").  
 181 These issues were the basis of the criticism of Simon Leis, a notorious Cincinnati 
prosecutor who undertook a modern-day crusade to fully enforce obscenity laws either to further 
his own principles or to garner personal publicity. See, e.g., Isabel Wilkerson, Profiles From 
Cincinnati: Cutting Edge of Art Scrapes Deeply Held Beliefs; Sheriff: When a Crusade Is a 
Career, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1990, at A6 (“[Leis] who is considered the leading guardian of 
morality...is arguably the most popular politician in Hamilton County, one who has won by wide 
margins almost every office he has ever sought”); Horstman, supra note 180, 181 at C1 
(“Prosecutors have discretion over which cases to pursue and how to proceed, and Leis adopted a 
frontal assault on any magazine, movie or play that offended his sensibilities”). In one sense, this 
prosecutor merely abided by the legislative will, for the pornography laws he enforced were on 
the books. But in using the legislative will as a neutral justification for advancing his career 
publicly, the prosecutor arguably violated the non-bias principle; he may have considered 
personal advancement and the desire for personal notoriety in reaching his decisions. The 
theoretical problem this scenario illustrates is significant: the appeal to a neutral principle – here, 
executing the legislative will - by definition justifies impermissible behavior. The scenario 
suggests the limitations of neutrality reasoning in identifying appropriate exercises of 
prosecutorial discretion.  
 182 See supra text accompanying note 68; cf. Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a 
Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 352-53 (2002) (contending that, 
although the historical shift from private to public prosecutions stemmed from concerns about 
miscarriages of justice produced by both victims and defendants, “the desire for [prosecutorial] 
neutrality has driven a wedge between prosecutors and those individuals and communities that 
need their services”).  
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cause to believe a crime has been committed, but personally has a reasonable doubt about guilt 
(or even believes that the defendant is not guilty). If committed to the neutral principle that only 
the guilty should be punished, the neutral prosecutor arguably should rely on her view of the 
defendant’s innocence. Yet institutional, systemic imperatives militate in favor of leaving that 
judgment to the jury. 183 The prosecutor’s commitment to these neutral systemic principles of 
criminal law enforcement may conflict with her commitment to the neutral principle regarding 
convictions of the innocent. 
 In a broader sense, some conceptions of prosecutorial neutrality (e.g., objectivity, 
independence) elevate the importance of the exercise of individual prosecutors’ judgment. Those 
approaches are inherently in tension with conceptions that emphasize deference – for example, 
deference to legislative will or to fixed neutral principles that should guide prosecutors’ 
conduct.184 
 The potential irreconcilability of specific decisionmaking criteria or neutral sub-
principles does not establish that the more general dimensions of neutrality are inconsistent. But 
it does suggest the difficulty of implementing a conception of neutrality in a way that can 
                                                 
 183 Presumably, the jury is supposed to determine the facts. When a real dispute exists, 
the victim arguably is entitled to have her day in court and to have the jury do its job. Society has 
an interest in permitting the trial process to function as the mechanism for achieving accurate and 
appropriate results. In allowing a prosecutor to proceed based on a minimal “probable cause” 
standard, the professional rules arguably suggest that the prosecutor should set aside her belief 
regarding the ultimate facts to be adjudicated and allow the fact- finders to proceed. See, e.g., 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.8(a) (2002) 
(“The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: (a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the 
prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause”) [hereinafter “MODEL RULES”].  
 184 The problem is magnified when prosecutors resort to highly malleable neutral 
principles to justify their decisionmaking, such as the need to pursue “fairness.” Consider the 
prosecutor who believes it to be unfair to prosecute someone found with a small amount of 
marijuana. Or suppose a prosecutor questions the fairness of using dubious indictments to force 
cooperation of defendants in the war on terrorism. When these prosecutors implement their 
potentially legitimate feelings regarding fairness, they in effect emphasize their own beliefs over 
those of their constituents (e.g., other governmental agencies). Their quest for fairness may 
contradict other principles that sometimes are said to bind neutral prosecutors - including the 
legislative will (e.g., in punishing marijuana possession) and the need to make decisions with 
reference only to law enforcement policies. In part, this illustrates the importance of developing 
more concrete neutral principles, but it also shows that the pursuit of some principles can lead to 
forms of partisanship or lack of objectivity. 
 It also illustrates the tension between inherently context-based principles such as fairness 
and principles that rely on prosecutors to act based on fixed criteria – for example, the existence 
of a statutory directive or the fact of guilt or innocence. A fairness approach also may conflict 
with other contextually-based criteria that militate in the same direction in particular cases - for 
example, law enforcement policies (e.g., the need for incapacitation and deterrence). 
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achieve consensus. More importantly, for our purposes, the illustrations suggest that it is not 
helpful for commentators to characterize prosecutorial failure to satisfy one possible neutral 
principle as a failure to act neutrally. For an accusation that the prosecutor was not “neutral” to 
have meaning, commentators must first acknowledge the essential complexity of the term. 
 
VI. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF PROSECUTORIAL NEUTRALITY’S WEAKNESSES AS A 
GOVERNING PRINCIPLE 
 
 Prosecutorial neutrality, as a general concept, has considerable rhetorical force. Yet, as 
this Article has shown, the concept has no fixed meaning or, rather, has many different 
meanings. At some level, each dimension of neutrality might gain broad acceptance. Most would 
agree, for example, that prosecutors should be non-biased, if all that signifies is that prosecutors 
should not treat similarly situated defendants differently based on their race, religion or gender; 
that prosecutors should be nonpartisan, if that means only that prosecutors ought not invariably 
defer to the police or to victims; and that prosecutors should be principled, at least to the extent 
of consistently applying decisionmaking criteria that the legislature explicitly directs them to 
apply. But beyond the core of these dimensions, each is uncertain in theory and application. 185 It 
is equally unclear how the various conceptions fit together, since there are tensions among 
them.186  
 The most obvious implication of this analysis is for observers and commentators. For the 
moment at least,187 one should not criticize particular prosecutorial conduct as lacking neutrality 
without stating in what sense one is using the term. It is easy to point to the absence of neutrality, 
in some sense, whenever one has a gut feeling that an individual prosecutor acted wrongfully. 
Yet because neutrality has multiple interpretations, it is just as easy for the prosecutor to respond 
that she acted neutrally, though perhaps in a different respect. Unless and until society develops a 
shared understanding of what neutrality entails, the concept fails to provide a useful norm. 
 This Article’s analysis suggests that the public holds prosecutors to a high standard. The 
notion of neutrality is imprecise because it stands for many sub-principles, or even alternative 
principles, each of which is important. Although prosecutors sometimes have been called 
“ministers of justice,”188 prosecuting is not a ministerial task. It calls for the exercise of judgment 
at virtually every step. Society has lofty expectations for how prosecutors should make those 
judgments, though those expectations are vague and not universally shared in all their details.189 
                                                 
 185 See supra Parts II-IV. 
 186 See supra Part V. 
 187 In other words, until a better understanding of neutrality develops. 
 188 See, e.g., MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8 cmt. (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a 
minister of justice”). 
 189 Despite the tensions among the dimensions of neutrality, the dimensions do suggest 
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 A second implication of this Article therefore is that prosecutors and the public need to 
develop clearer understandings about how prosecutors should make judgments. First-order 
principles, such as that prosecutors should be neutral or should seek justice,190 may serve as a 
point of departure for analyses of prosecutorial discretion, but they are just a beginning. Standing 
alone, they are of dubious value precisely because they are so broad and over-arching. It thus is  
important not only to clarify first-order principles governing prosecutorial decisionmaking, but 
also to identify the second-order or sub-principles that we consider to be at their core. These 
likely will apply more narrowly, but they also may focus more specifically on the factors that 
society wishes prosecutors to implement or ignore. If, for example, we expect prosecutors to be 
non-biased, nonpartisan, and principled, what do each of those ideas mean and how do they 
interrelate?191 
 This raises the crucial question of how to identify both first- and second-order principles 
of decisionmaking. As a practical matter, this is not a task that individual assistant prosecutors 
can easily accomplish on their own. None have enough time, given their ordinary 
responsibilities. As a theoretical matter, societally acceptable principles or sub-principles are 
unlikely to emerge without public deliberation among prosecutors and others who represent a 
range of perspectives and experiences. 
 When individual prosecutors are forced to determine how to proceed in the absence of 
                                                                                                                                                             
one common theme. In exercising discretion, prosecutors have a personal responsibility to reach 
appropriate decisions. All of the conceptions seem to embrace the notion that prosecutors cannot 
simply accept conclusions that they are given (e.g., by the police or the public). Even the 
conceptions that call upon prosecutors to follow law enforcement principles or explicit 
legislative directives assign individual prosecutors the task of determining the content of the 
underlying principles or directives. 
 190 The “seek justice” standard has been incorporated in lawyer codes of conduct to 
express the drafters’ general expectation of prosecutorial conduct. The lawyer codes include a 
handful of more specific rules dealing with particular aspects of prosecutorial conduct. Although 
the duty to “seek justice” might, in theory, fill in the gaps, the standard does not give much 
additional guidance to prosecutors and, not surprisingly, has rarely been used as a disciplinary 
standard. 
 There is an argument to be made that the very nature of discretionary decisions should 
immunize them from disciplinary rules, except at the extremes. Even if one were to accept this 
position, however, the organized bar could still play a central role in working with prosecutors to 
identify more precise principles of prosecution. To a limited extent, the AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE purport to serve that function. Although this 
Article is not the place for a full analysis of the Standards, we think it plain that they are 
incomplete and not adequate to the task. 
 191 For example, how persuasive must the evidence be to justify bringing or continuing a 
prosecution or defending a conviction once obtained; when is a law too antiquated to be 
enforced; when should a prosecutor decline to proceed against someone even though there is 
adequate proof of guilt? 
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defined standards, their ordinary response is to base their decisions on intuitions, informed by 
individual values, experience, and prosecutorial tradition. This approach is unlikely to result in 
“neutral” decisionmaking in any of the senses we have identified. One can have little confidence 
that decisionmaking will be unbiased, nonpartisan, and principled unless prosecutors have 
adequate criteria to guide their decisionmaking and are willing to engage in conscious 
deliberation regarding the reasons for their decisions.192 
 A third implication of this Article’s analysis is therefore that, in the absence of publicly-
defined principles, chief prosecutors should identify principles and sub-principles to govern 
decisionmaking in their offices and should communicate those principles and supervise 
individual prosecutors to ensure that the principles are applied.193  
                                                 
 192 To avoid acting aimlessly, a prosecutor must at a minimum identify for herself which 
lodestar, or lodestars, are guiding her. Only by doing so can she assess her own conduct. Because 
a prosecutor’s decisionmaking inevitably will be contextual, she is likely to rely on multiple 
conceptions of neutrality, each of varying applicability. Identifying the conceptions that are 
significant to her may enable the prosecutor to engage in some prioritization. It may enable her 
to explicitly reject some conceptions as well. Perhaps more importantly, identifying the basis for 
her exercise of discretion enables her office to engage in meaningful supervision and review – 
both for the purpose of managing her conduct and for the purpose of ordering the mass of 
decisions that all prosecutors in the office make.   
 193 For example, the office’s guidelines would be expected to address the office’s 
conception of the prosecutors’ role as gatekeepers to prevent the conviction of innocent 
individuals and, at various levels of specificity or generality, any sub-principles that, in the 
office’s view, grow out of that role. An office that takes an expansive view of the prosecutors’ 
gatekeeper role might say that prosecutors in the office have an obligation at every stage of a 
criminal proceeding, including post-conviction, to prevent the conviction and punishment of 
individuals who are factually innocent. From this it might follow, among other things, that 
prosecutors must not initiate or continue a prosecution when, viewed objectively, the evidence 
raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt; that prosecutors must make reasonable 
efforts to seek exculpatory evidence; and that prosecutors must reevaluate the evidence at any 
stage when new evidence is found that casts doubt on the defendant’s guilt. On the other hand, 
an office that views the prosecutor’s gatekeeper role more narrowly might announce very 
different principles, such as that the prosecutor may initiate and continue a prosecution as long as 
there is probable cause, and then leave it to the adversary process to resolve questions of guilt 
and innocence. 
 Similarly, the office’s guidelines would be expected to address, at various levels of 
generality and specificity, how prosecutors should make discretionary decisions in cases where 
evidence of guilt is sufficiently persuasive. By way of analogy, federal law provides that a 
juvenile may not be tried as an adult in federal court unless the court determines that prosecution 
as an adult is “in the interest of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 5032. At a greater level of specificity, the 
statute then identifies six factors that the district court must consider in making such 
determination: the age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; 
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 As we have discussed, however,194 even the development of internal administrative 
guidelines is unlikely to solve the problem of inconsistent application of the guidelines by 
individual prosecutors. Chief prosecutors thus must consider which discretionary decisions to 
assign to individual prosecutors, when the decisions should be reviewed by senior prosecutors, 
and when they should be taken out of individual prosecutors’ hands altoge ther.195 There is a cost 
to having decisions differ depending on which assistant prosecutor is assigned to a case.196 
Enhanced supervision of individual prosecutorial decisions can reduce the negative 
consequences of disparate decisionmaking, but that often results in inefficient use of resources. 
As a consequence, the chief prosecutor might prefer to develop procedures through which 
categories of decisions can be referred to a particular supervisory prosecutor, or to a board of 
prosecutors, who are better able to decide similar cases uniformly. These decisionmakers, at 
least, may be in a position to develop a “common law” for how the office approaches specific 
issues.197 
 It is important to note that some dimensions of neutrality may be especially difficult for 
individual prosecutors to implement well at particular stages of prosecutions. For example, 
prosecutors in the midst of trial typically are less able than other prosecutors to maintain 
objectivity in reviewing evidence;198 at that stage, prosecutors have already adopted a partisan 
                                                                                                                                                             
the extent and nature of the juvenile’s prior delinquency record; the juvenile’s present 
intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the 
juvenile’s response to such efforts; the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile’s 
behavioral problems. Id. Presumably, over time, judicial decisions under the statute have offered 
guidance to courts in future cases about how these factors should be applied. In like manner, 
prosecutors’ offices could identify general standards for making decisions such as whether to 
prosecute a juvenile, relevant factors, and examples of how the standards have been or should be 
applied in particular cases.  
 194 See supra text accompanying note 173. 
 195 For example, in homicide cases where the death penalty might be sought, the decision 
whether to bring a capital murder charge and, if so, whether to accept a plea in exchange for a 
lesser sentence, might be made by a high-ranking prosecutor or by a committee of high-ranking 
prosecutors. 
 196 These costs include, inter alia, disparity in prosecution decisions, the sense on the part 
of defendants that the system operates inequitably, and a loss of faith in the process by the 
public. Moreover, haphazard prosecutions create pressure for judicial action to harmonize cases, 
which in turn may lead to apparent haphazardness in judicial decisionmaking. 
 197 The office common law may take the form of an enhanced institutional memory or more 
formal record-keeping of office decisions and why they were made. 
 198 Cf. Leonard N. Sasnov, Separation of Powers Shell Game: The Federal Witness 
Immunity Act, 73 TEMPLE L. REV. 171, 203 (2000) (“In the heat of trial, there is [little] reason to 
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advocate’s posture.199 Professor Uviller thus has suggested that, under some circumstances, 
discretionary decisionmaking responsibility should be split among different prosecutors, or parts 
of prosecutors’ offices, even with respect to individual cases.200 
 Prosecutors, and particularly chief prosecutors, clearly have a dominant role to play in 
defining the principles and sub-principles that will govern neutral decisionmaking. They have the 
most familiarity with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In part, the application of any 
criteria that are identified depends upon resources and structural issues relating to each 
prosecutors’ office.201  
 Yet some conceptions of neutrality depend upon decisions by other actors and, as a 
consequence, inevitably include those actors in the process of ordering prosecutorial 
decisionmaking. Consider, for example, the role of legislators in defining appropriate principles 
and sub-principles of prosecutorial decisionmaking. Prosecutors typically help establish the 
contours of legislation, 202 but society probably has at least a general preference for prosecutorial 
obedience to the lawmakers’ will.203 The problem that this Article has noted is that legislatures 
rarely adopt laws anticipating that they will be fully and uniformly enforced.204  
                                                                                                                                                             
trust a prosecutor ‘to maintain the requisite neutrality’ to decide which potential witnesses with 
valid Fifth Amendment claims should be forced to testify in the public interest”).  
 199 See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 105, 171 (1994) (“It is easier before a case 
has begun to try to remain impartial, objective, and detached”); Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics, 
supra note 93, at 56 (discussing the need for prosecutors to be partisan advocates at trial); see 
also Lee, supra note 59, at 235-36 (arguing that, at the sentencing stage, “the prosecutor is not a 
completely neutral, unbiased party”). 
 200 Uviller, supra note 40, at 1714 (“I believe that for the office of prosecutor faithfully to 
discharge the incompatible roles of advocate and arbiter, the investigators and adjudicators 
should be segregated from the advocates”); see also George C. Harris, The Communitarian 
Function of the Criminal Jury Trial and the Rights of the Accused, 74 NEB. L. REV. 804, 815 
(1995) (noting “an unbearable tension between two prosecutorial roles: that of litigant in an 
adversary system and that of neutral agent of justice. . . . [A prosecutor] cannot realistically 
remain a neutral agent of justice above the adversary fray at the time that she is asked to consent 
to jury waiver”). 
 201 For example, the supervisory structure in an office, the number of prosecutors it 
contains, and the ability of the office to segregate functions each prosecutor performs. 
 202 See supra text accompanying note 123. 
 203 Individual prosecutors are not lawmakers. The source of their authority to override 
legislation is unclear, particularly when one recalls that different prosecutors within a single 
office may reach inconsistent public policy conclusions.  
 204 At a minimum, resource constraints prevent universal prosecution and incarceration of 
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 Accordingly, it becomes difficult – even for prosecutors willing to obey legislative 
mandates – to identify the legislature’s true will. A fourth, clear implication of this Article’s 
analysis is that, as a practical matter, legislators can obviate prosecutors’ dilemmas in many 
cases simply by drafting the pertinent statutes more explicitly.205 
 Conversely, however, legislators should not tie prosecutors’ hands unless they truly mean 
to do so. In practice, many of the laws that pose problems for prosecutors206 reflect legislative 
ambivalence. Lawmakers may wish to take a public position - for example, an anti-crime 
position, as in mandatory minimum sentencing and three-strikes schemes – fully expecting 
prosecutors and courts to reduce the impact of the laws.207 Yet by appearing to channel 
prosecutorial discretion, laws such as these make it difficult for prosecutors to satisfy legitimate 
public expectations. The laws force prosecutors to choose between conflicting demands – 
obeisance to the apparent legislative will, on the one hand, and the commitment to ordinary ideas 
of retribution and deterrence, on the other. Our analysis suggests that legislators should take care 
when they incorporate specific expectations into law and should minimize hidden reliance on the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
 Finally, what are the implications of our analysis for judges or bar associations in drafting 
rules of professional conduct to regulate, or help to define, the appropriate exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion. 208 Until now, prosecutors have been regulated by the rules of conduct 
                                                                                                                                                             
all offenders who technically have violated the law. 
 205 See Frank J. Remington, The Future of the Substantive Criminal Law Codification 
Movement – Theoretical and Practical Concerns, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 867, 894 (1988) (suggesting 
that the penal code “try to specify those provisions that should be fully enforced and those 
allowing discretion to enforce and, if discretion is allowed, indicate by whom that choice can be 
made and in accordance with what standards”). 
 206 At the extremes, the prosecutorial decisionmaking process is manageable. Prosecutors 
know that they cannot base all their decisions on legislative judgments. Conversely, most 
prosecutors typically will not violate specific legal mandates. Within the middle ground, some 
prosecutors adopt the posture that they must defer to legislative judgements only when such 
judgments are explicit in the statutory scheme. Others defer to legislative judgments whenever 
they are reasonably ascertainable.  
 207 Cf. Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody’s Watching: Legal Advertising 
as a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 971, 1011 
(2002) (noting the phenomenon of professional rulemakers adopting “broad but popular rules – 
even altogether inappropriate rules – with the expectation that they will not be enforced as 
written”). 
 208 Although the American Bar Association (ABA) has historically drafted model rules of 
professional conduct for proposed adoption by the state courts, it may be argued that the ABA is 
not well suited to develop rules for prosecutors in particular, and that judicial committees ought 
to oversee this project. Bruce A. Green, supra note 25, at __. 
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that apply generally to lawyers, but which may be interpreted differently as applied to 
prosecutors, and by a handful of additional rules that essentially restate prosecutors’ preexisting 
legal obligations.209 In commentary, the professional codes also posit that prosecutors have 
additional professional obligations that the codes do not identify and may not expect to be 
enforced in the disciplinary process, arising out the prosecutor’s general duty to seek “justice”.210 
Although this first order principle cannot be characterized as wrong, the failure to define its 
requirements has led, in part, to the same generalized and unproductive criticism as 
commentators’ reliance on neutrality rhetoric. The traditional approach has not furthered the 
development of standards for appropriate prosecutorial conduct. 
 The code drafters’ approach has many possible explanations.211 A likely one, given recent 
controversies over prosecutorial ethics, is that the ABA cannot stomach the resistance it knows it 
will meet if it attempts to develop more substantial rules to constrain prosecutorial conduct. 
Another may be the realization that, particularly with respect to discretionary decisionmaking, 
“prosecutors may be in a better position than courts [and rule drafters] to determine what 
standards to apply, because prosecutors have ‘superior experience, expertise or knowledge.”212 
Code drafters may also think it is too difficult to identify suitable rules to constrain prosecutorial 
decisionmaking, given the variety of factors relevant to prosecutors’ work and the factually 
complex nature of their cases. Or they may think that vague, unenforceable statements suffice. 
 Whatever the explanations, the codes’ approach to prosecutorial justice has costs. Most 
importantly, it leads courts and commentators to believe, and act as if, loose characterizations of 
prosecutorial functions have sufficient meat to resolve hard cases. It diverts attention from the 
important task of regulating prosecutors and providing them guidance.  
 Regardless of whether more rules are needed, and whether the ABA or courts have the 
political wherewithal to adopt them, code drafters can do better than leaving it to others to apply, 
or ignore, the vague injunction to “seek justice.” First, the ABA and courts can flesh out general 
societal expectations. There is no reason why prosecutors alone should decide whether it is 
desirable to be “neutral” in any or all of the respects that we have identified, and to decide for 
themselves what neutrality entails. In the absence of enforceable rules to constrain prosecutors’ 
discretion, the ABA and others who traditionally draft rules of professional conduct should take 
the lead in identifying appropria te principles of prosecutorial conduct that will both guide 
prosecutors and provide a standard by which the public can measure their visible conduct.  
 Further, rule drafters should give more serious thought to whether additional rules are in 
fact needed. When code drafters adopt general standards, as they have in the case of prosecutors, 
                                                 
 209 E.g., MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8. 
 210 See e.g., MODEL RULES, Rule 3.8 cmt. (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a 
minister of justice”). 
 211 These explanations are discussed more fully in Green, supra note 25, at __-__. 
 212 Id. at __. 
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they often expect disciplinary agencies to spell out the details in common law fashion. 213 Yet 
historically, disciplinary agencies rarely have addressed prosecutorial conduc t.214  
 In fairness, because of the contextual nature of prosecutors’ responsibilities and the range 
of legitimate prosecutorial discretion, disciplinary agencies probably only can target extreme 
instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Nevertheless, because of the issues this Article raises, it 
may be particularly important for disciplinary agencies to take a proactive approach to 
identifying those instances in which the obligation of prosecutorial neutrality can be defined.215 
Even more importantly, disciplinary agencies should focus on cases in which the results will be 
well-publicized, and the agencies should take care to disseminate those results.216 Doing so can 
inform the public debate regarding the appropriate meaning of neutrality and can help educate 




 Because most specific prosecutorial decisions are unreviewable, there is an obvious need 
for informed public discussion about how these decisions are made. The difficulty, of course, is 
that much of what prosecutors do is never made public. Even when their work is visible, 
prosecutors rarely explain how their decisions came to be and rarely identify the facts upon 
which the decisions were based.  
 The practical realities of the criminal justice system, including the sheer volume of cases 
that need to be disposed of, to a large extent require society to trust prosecutors to make 
decisions in the right way and on the right grounds. Prosecutors would be far less effective if 
their work were transparent. Full transparency might also compromise the safety and privacy of 
agents, witnesses, and others.  
 Yet the fact remains that, for better or worse, prosecutors are among the least accountable 
public officials. As a result, in evaluating prosecutors’ work, the public tends to overemphasize 
the measurable or obvious aspects of what prosecutors do (e.g., the number of convictions they 
obtain, the length of sentences, and prosecutors’ behavior in public trials) and tend to overlook 
more momentous decisions that occur behind the scenes.217 
                                                 
 213 See Zacharias, supra note 207, at 1011-12 (describing how “inartfully drafted 
provisions” can be saved through disciplinary decisions conducted in secret) 
 214 See Zacharias, supra note 37, at 744-45 (reporting the infrequent discipline of 
prosecutors) 
 215 See id. at 774 (describing and urging proactive discipline of prosecutors).  
 216 See Zacharias, supra note 207, at 1019-20 (“it is incumbent upon the bar to take an 
especially active approach to addressing public rule violations”). 
 217 Take, for example, a defendant who is arrested for selling narcotics three times to an 
undercover officer. If the prosecutor charges the defendant with three counts of selling narcotics 
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 Prosecutors’ limited public accountability might be acceptable, or at least more 
acceptable, if there were well-established normative standards governing prosecutors’ 
discretionary decisionmaking. In that event, the public could elect people of integrity to serve as 
prosecutors, or higher officials could appoint them, and then trust them faithfully to apply 
accepted criteria. But our analysis of the concept of “prosecutorial neutrality” demonstrates that 
there are no settled understandings, except perhaps at the most general and abstract level. All 
might agree that prosecutors should be “neutral,” just as they might agree that prosecutors should 
be “fair” or that they should “seek justice.” But none of these terms has a fixed meaning. They 
are proxies for a constellation of other, sometimes equally vague, normative expectations about 
how prosecutors should make decisions.  
 As we have shown, neutrality has been used in different contexts to denote a range of 
expectations that can be grouped under three different conceptions: non-bias, nonpartisanship, 
and principled decisionmaking. These dimensions of neutrality, though somewhat more concrete 
than the umbrella term, still have variable content. Nor is it clear how the conceptions fit 
together. In the end, therefore, these too fall short in providing meaningful guidance for the 
discretionary decisions that prosecutors routinely must make.  
 Consequently, there is a need for more robust commentary and analysis. It is neither 
helpful simply to ask prosecutors to be “neutral” nor fair to criticize prosecutors for alleged 
failures to act “neutrally.” Indeed, the neutrality rhetoric is singularly unpersuasive as criticism, 
because even the most egregious prosecutorial decisions can ordinarily be defended as “neutral” 
in some sense of the term. 
 Ultimately, our analysis suggests a need for deeper thinking by prosecutors and for a 
public articulation of clearer first- and second-order principles that can guide prosecutors’ 
decisions. Although “neutrality” may have a variety of possible meanings, virtually every 
conception presupposes that prosecutors should make decisions based on the consistent 
application of norms derived from the law and common societal understandings. There are good 
reasons for prosecutors not to explain, or even to reveal, their rationales for decisions in some 
individual cases, but there is no justification for failing to identify the principles and sub-
principles that generally govern their decisionmaking. 
 Thus, if the “neutrality” standard does not provide a benchmark for critiquing individual 
prosecutors’ specific decisions, it does offer a basis for criticizing prosecutors’ widespread 
failure to offer a coherent account of what they do. Of course, the problem is not merely one of 
secrecy. The core difficulty is that prosecutors have never identified, even among themselves, a 
coherent workable set of decisionmaking criteria. Consequently, they cannot possibly act in 
uniformly principled fashion.  
 This, then, is our main prescriptive point: each prosecutor’s office should attempt to 
articulate standards. As the Article has shown, specific rules or criteria constraining prosecutorial 
decisionmaking cannot be formulated without first identifying fundamental governing norms. 
                                                                                                                                                             
and later permits the defendant to plead guilty to only one count, the prosecutor’s discretionary 
decision will be visible, and may be criticized as too lenient. On the other hand, the prosecutor 
may reach the same agreement with the defendant before charges are filed, and then file a one-
count indictment to which the defendant pleads guilty. While the result will be the same, the 
prosecutor’s discretionary decision will be less obvious and may be entirely invisible.  
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Although these norms need not be universally accepted, they ought to have some claim to public 
support. 
 Identifying these baselines will be no easy task, but the first step seems clear. It is 
difficult to imagine the development of any consensus regarding appropriate prosecutorial 
behavior resulting from a unilateral effort by prosecutors – without public input, review, and 
debate. Commentators, bar representatives, and legislatures need to participate in the process. It 
is time for a collective effort to identify meaningful principles to govern prosecutors’ exercise of 
discretion. 
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